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Torts, Race, and the Value of Injury, 
1900-1949 
JENNIFER B. WRIGGINS©* 
"[T]he problem of the Twentieth Century is the problem of the 
color-line. "1 
Tort law [is] public law in disguise.2 
INTRODUCTION3 
Tort law is one of the central, and most familiar, aspects of U.S. 
law. Every law student, by the end of his or her first year, has a basic 
picture of the subject of torts. In addition to being a significant mech­
anism for compensating and deterring injury,4 it has significant norma­
tive and narrative dimensions. 5 Tort law values and recognizes injury 
in ways that create deterrence incentives for potential defendants and 
send broad messages about what society deems important. However, 
© Jennifer B. Wriggins 2005 
• Professor, University of Maine School of Law. 
1. W.E.B. DuBOIS, THE SouLS OF BLACK FOLK 5 (Everyman's Library 1993) (1903). 
2. Leon Green, Tort Law Public Law in Disguise, 38 TEX. L. REv. 1 (1959). 
3. Acknowledgments: I am grateful to David Goldman, Zachary Brandmeir, and Joshua 
Scott for outstanding research assistance. Thanks to David Achtenberg, Martha Chamallas, 
George Chauncey, William Corbett, Zanita Fenton, Rachel D. Godsil, James Hackney, Duncan 
Kenneay, Lois Lupica, and Deborah Tuerkheimer for reviewing drafts. Thanks to Dean Colleen 
Khoury, Dean Peter Pitegoff, and the University of Maine School of Law for funding this 
project, and to the University of Maine School of Law Faculty for allowing me to present an 
early draft at a faculty workshop. The Boston University School of Law Faculty and the 
Northeastern University School of Law Faculty provided very useful comments at faculty 
workshop presentations. I also have benefited from discussions with Mary L. Bonauto, Keith N. 
Hylton, Randall Kennedy, Katharine Silbaugh, Barbara Welke, and John Fabian Witt. Many 
thanks to the librarians at the Donald Garbrecht Law Library at the University of Maine School 
of Law, particularly Christine Hepler, Sherry McCall, and Greg Stowe. Thanks to the editors of 
the HowARD LAw JouRNAL, particularly Brandi Johnson and Autumn Montague. 
4. DAN T. DoBBS, THE LAw oF ToRTS 12 (2000) (noting that "[t)he most commonly men­
tioned aims of tort law are (1) compensation of injured persons and (2) deterrence of undesir­
able behavior"). 
5. See Ellen S. Pryor, The Stories We Tell: Intentional Harm and the Quest for Insurance 
Funding, 75 TEx. L. REv. 1721, 1748 (1997). 
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we have an incomplete and impoverished understanding of the torts 
system because we have ignored the ways that it has been structured 
by systems of racial inequality and has reinforced those systems. This 
Article begins to broaden our understanding of the torts system by 
focusing on ways in which it measured harm to plaintiffs depending on 
their race during the first half of the twentieth century. 
Readers often approach the topic of race6 and torts in the first 
half of the twentieth century with one of two unexamined assump­
tions. The first is an ahistorical assumption that the torts system has 
treated everyone equally, and therefore race has been irrelevant in the 
torts system in the United States. The second assumption is that the 
United States' legal system, given the virulent racism of the era, must 
have denied to all black people all tort compensation for their injuries. 
This Article demonstrates how both assumptions are incorrect. De­
spite the barriers imposed by racist exclusionary structures and vio­
lence during this period, many black people sued for and received 
compensation for tort injuries, winning verdicts and appellate deci­
sions in all regions.7 However, the fact that black plaintiffs partici­
pated in the torts system as plaintiffs does not mean that they were 
6. This Article considers cases involving those perceived to be African American and Cau­
casian. Case s involving other racial or ethnic groups have not been researched for this Article. 
The term "black" refers to African American people and others identified in cases as "Negro" or 
"colored." Occasionally the term " African American" is used in such contexts. The term 
"white" refers to Caucasian people and those perceived or identified as white. This Article's 
focus on issues involving blacks and whites is not to suggest that such issues comprise the entire 
subject of race and torts. See generally. Leslie Espinoza, Angela P. Harris, Afterward: Embrac­
ing the Tar-Baby: LatCrit Theory and the Sticky Mess ofRace, 85 CAL. L. REv. 1585 (1997) . This 
Article does not discuss the interesting and important issues of racial identification, social con­
struction, and performance that scholarship has begun to address. See, e.g., Ariela J. Gross, 
Litigating Whiteness: Trials of Racial Determination in the Nineteenth -Century South, 108 YALE 
L. J. 109 (1998); Ian F. Haney Lopez, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on 
lllusion, Fabrication and Choice, 29 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1 (1994); Cheryl J. Harris, White­
ness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REv. 1709 (1993); Daniel J. Sharfstein, The Secret History ofRace 
in the United States , 112 YALE L. J. 1473 (2003). 
7. See infra Parts I-III; BARBARA YoUNG WELKE, RECASTING AMERICAN LIBERTY: GEN· 
DER, RAcE, LAw, & TIJE RAILROAD REVOLUTION, 1865-1920 (2001). Indeed, favorable jury 
verdicts, trial decisions, and appellate tort rulings for black plaintiffs were obtained even during 
the late nine teenth century. See, e.g., The General Rucker, 35 F. 152 (W.D. Tenn. 1888). The 
court referred to "simple-minded Negroes," and described the plaintiff as a "negro man of infer­
ior intelligence," where the black plaintiff was awarded $100 in an admiralty case for battery by 
first mate. /d. at 154, 159; Gasway v. Atlanta & W. Point R.R. , 1877 WL 2979 (Ga. Jan. Term 
1877) (reversing award of $10 for a black man's tort suit against railway for conductor and claims 
agent's threatening and insulting conduct towards him and ordering remand for new trial be­
cause jury instructions were improperly favorable to the defendant); Louisville, Nashville & 
GreatS. R.R. v. Fleming, 1884 WL 3325 (Tenn. Dec. Term 1884) (ordering new trial because jury 
instructions were too unfavorable to the railroad against eighty-three year old black man ejected 
from a train for allegedly not having a ticket readily available). 
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treated equally with whites. Examining inequality in the law, both 
then and now, requires more than knowing whether clear exclusions 
operated to blatantly fence out groups of people.8 As scholars have 
shown more recently in other contexts, decentralized, informal prac­
tices engaged in by individual actors within the legal system, for exam­
ple, have resulted in a discriminatory structure and discriminatory 
outcomes when aggregated.9 Indeed, race has mattered in torts in 
ways that have resulted in categorization of harm to black plaintiffs as 
in some instances necessarily less than to whites. Moreover, individu­
alized, decentralized practices have resulted in lower aggregate com­
pensation to blacks than to whites. This Article claims that a range of 
evidence compels the conclusion that African Americans' tort claims 
generally were devalued relative to whites' tort claims during the first 
half of the twentieth century. 
The intersections of race and tort law are particularly provocative 
because they reflect an ongoing tension in tort law, and they implicate 
broad questions of equal treatment. This tension is between the no­
tion that liability and damages should be determined on an individual 
basis, and the notion that similar injuries should be treated similarly. 
On the one hand, a broad basic principle of the rule of law for hun­
dreds of years has been that everyone in the same situation should be 
treated the same way.10 According to basic ideas of formal equality, 
8. See JoDY DAVID ARMOUR, NeoROPHOBtA AND REASONABLE RACISM: THE HIDDEN 
CosTS oF BEING BLACK IN AMERICA (1997); IAN AYRES, PERVASIVE PREJUDICE? UNcONVE.N· 
TIONAL EviDENCE OF RACE AND GENDER DISCRIMINATION (2001); Martha Chamallas, The Ar­
chitecture of Bias: Deep Structures in Tort Law, 146 U. PA. L. REv. 463 (1998); Kimberle 
Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimina­
tion Law, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1331 (1988); Peggy C. Davis, Law as Microaggression , 98 YALE 
L.J. 1559 (1 989). 
9. See AYRES, supra note 8, at 20-25. Subtle but powerful cognitive patterns may result in 
unequal treatment. See Chamallas, supra note 8. 
10. The idea that " like cases should be treated alike" dates back to Aristotle. ARISTOTLE, 
THE NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS 112-116 (J. L. Ackrill & J . 0. Urmson eds., David Ross trans., rev. 
ed. 1980). This idea is often seen as a foundational principle of the U.S. legaJ system. See, e.g., 
HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE 
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 147 (William N. Eskridge & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) 
(describing the idea that " like cases should be treated alike" as an "underlying and pervasive 
principle of la w"). Articulating the broad principle only begins the analysis of determining what 
are the releva nt similarities and differences between cases and situations, because as Peter Wes­
ten explains in The Empty Idea ofEquality , 95 HARv. L. REv. 537,596 n.72 (1982), the idea does 
not provide guidance about what factors are relevant and what are not; see also Kenneth I. 
Winston, On Treating Like Cases Alike, 62 CAL. L. REv. 1, 4-5 (1974) (noting that the idea is 
incomplete without criteria of likeness and difference). The determinations by courts and legis­
latures of what constitute relevant similarities and differences often are what is most contested. 
Some theorists have argued that the principle of treating like cases alike, also referred to as 
formal equality, is inadequate, arguing, for example, that sameness should not be a prerequisite 
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similar injuries should produce similar compensation.11 A similar in­
jury to a black person and a white person should result in similar lia­
bility determinations and similar damages. Also, in theory, to 
determine whether a particular result in a particular situation was eq­
uitable, one would look at similar situations and see if the result was 
the same. If the result was not the same, it was in some way unfair.12 
On the other hand, the individualized assessment of liability and 
damages has been and continues to be an important value in the torts 
system.13 The decision-makers often are juries, who have tremendous 
discretion in deciding liability and assessing damages. Different juries 
and judges can make conflicting determinations of liability and dam­
ages on virtually identical facts. As a result, the notion of rigorously 
comparing litigation outcomes to determine if parties have ·been 
for fair and equal treatment, see, e.g. , CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, WoMEN 's LivEs, MEN'S 
LAws 45-54 (2005); MARTHA MINow, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, ExcLUSION , 
AND AMERICAN LAw 51-78 (1990), and that formal equality masks structures that perpetuate 
inequality, see, e.g., Crenshaw, supra note 8. Some have attacked the idea as incoherent and 
tautological, see, e.g., Westen, supra, while others have argued that the idea has useful aspects, 
see e.g., Kent Greenwalt, How Empey is che Idea of Equalicy, 83 CoLUM. L. REv. 1167 (1983). 
This Article takes the position that the principle of treating like cases alike is one tool that can 
be used to an alyze race and valuation of U .S. tort cases in the first half of the twentieth century. 
This tool can be used for this purpose, without accepting the notion that determining what cases 
are "like" others is simple or unproblematic. A s will be seen, courts' decisions during this period 
about what cases are "like" others provide great insight into the workings of race, racism, and 
the civil justice system. See infra Part II. For example, the most glaring violation of this idea is 
the law of slavery, according to which some human beings were treated as less than human. See 
e.g., THOMAS D . MoRRIS, SoUTHERN SLAVERY AND THE LAw 1616 - 1860 (1996); JENNY 
BouRNE W AHL, THE BoNDSMAN's BuRDEN: AN EcoNOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE CoMMON LAw 
OF SOUTHERN SLAVERY (1998). 
11. See supra note 10. 
12. This methodology is limited because it does not reveal how "similar" different situations 
must be in order to be comparable. It presumes clarity and consensus about what is to be com­
pared, when in fact that is often what is most contested. /d. 
13. See, e.g. , Robert L. Rabin, The Quest for Fairness in Compensating Viclims ofSeptember 
11, 49 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 573, 578 (2001). Examples of the primacy of individual assessment of 
liability and damages are many. For example, the thin skull rule allows decision-makers broad 
discretion in determining liability. DoBBS, supra note 4 at 464-465 (describing the "thin skull" 
rule that a negligent defendant is liable for all personal injuries the defendant causes the plaintiff 
to suffer, even if those injuries are greater than a normal or average person would suffer.). 
Juries have tremendous, although not unlimited discretion, in determining damages. See VJN· 
CENT R. JoHNsoN & ALLAN GuNN, SruDrEs IN AMERICAN ToRT LAw 176-177 (2d ed. 1999) 
(discussing additur & remittitur). Tort law, with its individualized assessment of liability and 
damages, provides a striking contrast with certain aspects of workers' compensation systems, 
Dosss, supra note 4, at 1099-1100 (stating that under workers' compensation systems, whether a 
person is inju red is determined on an individual basis but the compensation amount is standard­
ized), and with the September 11 Victims Compensation Fund, see, e.g., Martha Chamallas, The 
Sepcember 11th Victim Compensation Fund: Rethinking the Damages Element in Injury Law , 71 
TENN. L. R Ev. 51, 75-79 (2003) (discussing the standardized presumed award of $250,000 for 
non-economic damages for family members of September 11 victims). 
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treated fairly is foreign to torts, since each injury is conceptualized as 
different and each person is different. 
Individualized assessment of damages in torts, however, has been 
and is a double-edged sword for African American plaintiffs in tort 
litigation. On the one hand, the individualized focus has forced courts 
and juries to look closely at the facts of each individual plaintiff's in­
jury and reach verdicts with reference to that injury. Tort juries and 
judges have quantified the unquantifiable, assigning damage amounts 
to such concepts as pain and suffering and loss of life through consid­
eration of cases one by one. The individualized focus is probably one 
reason African American plaintiffs attained as much success as they 
did as torts litigants. 14 On the other hand, the individualized focus 
allows tremendous inconsistency and makes unequal treatment hard 
to detect. 15 Rarely do courts systematically compare results in past 
cases.16 Torts judges and juries prefer instead to treat each case as 
unique, using past cases only for very general guidance. Moreover, in 
a society divided by racial caste, questions arise about what constitutes 
a "similar" injury to a black or white person.17 Patterns are and have 
always been difficult to discern in the multi-tiered and decentralized 
system of tort litigation.18 This Article uses a combination of methods 
to consider ways in which the awards in torts cases were influenced by 
race: reviewing materials on race and settlement; focusing on one 
high-profile New York case; and analyzing all wrongful death appel­
late cases from one jurisdiction, Louisiana, from 1900 to 1949. Com­
pelling and complex patterns have emerged from this exploration. 
The discussion of these patterns begins in the early twentieth cen­
tury because that time period marked a confluence of two striking 
trends. First, the number of tort cases increased dramatically in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth century, in part because of the 
14. See infra Part II. 
15. /d. 
16. /d.; Jennifer B. Wriggins, The Recognition of Injury: Race, Gender, and Torts, 1900­
1950 (June 28, 2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with The Howard Law Journal). 
17. See infra Part II; Wriggins, supra note 16. 
18. See, e.g., Michael J . Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort 
Litigation System-And Why Not?, 140 U . PA. L. REv. 1147, 1154-55, 1190 (1992) (explaining 
how aspects of the tort system, such as a decentralized adjudication system and decentralized 
recordkeeping, make it hard to study). It is impossible to keep track of cases that are settled 
before litigation is even filed. It is also hard to keep track of cases that settle, see Marc Galanter, 
Real World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 Mo. L. REv. 1093, 1099-1105 (1996), and to study 
the deterrence impact of litigation, see Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of 
Tort Law: Does the Tort System Really Deter?, 42 UCLA L. REv. 377 (1994). 
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many injuries and deaths connected with industrialization.19 Torts had 
only began to be conceptualized as a distinct branch of the law late in 
the nineteenth century, and theorists were engaged in analyzing it.20 
Second, a burgeoning growth of segregation, violence, discrimina­
tory laws, and racism also marked that time period.21 A racial caste 
system excluded blacks from equal participation in the legal system, 
and its underlying assumptions required social segregation of blacks 
and whites, at times in combination with gender .22 
The simultaneous resurgence of racism with the growth of tort 
law leads to questions about the relationship between tort law, race, 
19. JOHN FABIAN Wrrr, THE A ccJOENTAL REPUBLIC: CRIPPLED WORKINOMEN, DESTI· 
TUTE Wtoows, AND THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN LAw 1-15, 25-26, 59 (2004) [hereinafter 
Wrrr, AccJOENrAL REPUBuc]; Lawrence M. Friedman & Thomas D. Russell, More Civil 
Wrongs: Personal Injury Litigation, 1901-1910, 34 AM. J . LEGAL HlsT. 295 (1990); see also Law­
rence M . Friedman, Civil Wrongs: Personal Injury Law in the Late 19th Century, 1987 AM. B . 
FouND. Res. J. 351 (1987). Personal injury litigation did not become a major field of law, nor 
were there many tort cases, until the nineteenth century in the United States. LAWRENCE M. 
FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAw 300 (2d. ed. 1985) [hereinafter FRIEDMAN, His­
TORY]; John Fabian Witt, From Loss ofServices to Loss ofSuppon: The Wrongful Death Statutes, 
the Origins of Modern Ton Law, and the Making of the Nineteenth-Century Family, 25 LAw & 
Soc. INQUIRY 717, 722 (2002) [hereinafter Witt, Origins of Modem Ton]. 
20. G. EDWARD WHITE, ToRT LAw tN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 3 (expanded 
ed. 2003); see also Oliver Wendell Holmes' influential article, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. 
Rev. 457 (1897). 
21. See, e.g., C . VANN WoODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 98 (1966) (noting 
growth of discriminatory and segregation laws during the first two decades of the twentieth cen­
tury). More broadly, violence against blacks by whites in the South was pervasive during the Jim 
Crow period. WELKE, SUPRA note 7, at 364. Lynching was at its height between 1900 and the 
New Deal, and blacks had no political power. LAWRENCE M. fRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAw IN THE 
TWENTIETH CENTURY 117 (2002). 
22. fRIEDMAN, supra note 21, at 111-147, 280-348, 280 (describing the racial caste system 
and asserting that the "American system of apartheid was fmnly in place in the first half of the 
century''); see generally, JoHN DoLLARD, CASTE AND CLASS IN A SotiTHERN ToWN (1957) 
(describing social caste system requiring separation of white women from black men while al­
lowing white men's access to black women as well as white women). Juries were likely to have 
been all white and all male from at least 1900 to at least the 1950s. See Douglas L. Colbert, 
Challenging the Challenge: Thineenth Amendment as a Prohibition Against the Racial Use of 
Peremptory Challenges, 76 CoRNELL L. REv. I, 75-93 (1990) (describing exclusion of blacks from 
juries in south and north by exclusionary practices that continued at least until the mid 1960s). 
Although the Supreme Court in 1879 held that a statute which on its face barred everyone but 
white males from serving on juries was unconstitutional in Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 
303 (1879), exclusion of blacks from juries continued, see Gilbert Thomas Stevenson, Race Dis· 
tinctions in American Law, 43 AMER. L. REv. 869, 884, 888-900 (1909) (describing results of 
survey sent to Southern county clerks that reveal very few blacks served on juries). 
Similarly, the vast majority of attorneys were white and male in the South during the flrst 
half of the twentieth century: "It is generally known that the Negro lawyers in the Southern 
States are few, and it is considered that the field there for the Negro lawyer is not promising." 
Id. at 872. By 1940, there were 1,052 black lawyers and judges in the United States, and of these 
thirty-nine were women. J. CLAY SMITH, JR., EMANOPATION: THE MAKING or- THE BLACK 
LAwYER, 1844-1944, app. 2, tbl. 13 (1993). 
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racism, and equality that have not been considered before.23 What 
kinds of cases did black tort plaintiffs win, if any, in the first half of the 
twentieth century? When blacks and whites prevailed in tort cases, 
were the awards similar for similar injuries, or were awards to blacks 
less? Did the torts system recognize different kinds of harm to black 
and to white plaintiffs? How was the intersection of race and torts 
affected by gender?24 Because appellate courts in the first half of the 
twentieth century often identified the race of the plaintiff as "negro" 
or "colored," we can begin to formulate answers to these questions.25 
This Article primarily focuses on situations where harm to both 
blacks and whites was recognized as tortious, such as physical injuries 
caused by a railroad company's negligence; and also focuses on how 
the torts system measured harm to blacks and whites.Z6 Underlying 
23. Previous discussions of tort law and history generally have not discussed the racial 
dimensions of tort law. See, e.g., ToRT LAw IN AMERICAN HISTORY: MAJOR HISTORICAL INTER­
PRETATIONS (Kermit L. Hall ed., 1987); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
AMERICAN LAw, 1870-1960: THE CRISIS oF LEGAL ORTHODOXY (1992); WHITE, supra note 20; 
WITT, ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC, supra note 19. A notable exception is WELKE, supra note 7. 
Previous publications about race and law generally have not focused on tort law, however, work 
that has focused on race and torts includes: ChamaUas, Architecture, supra note 8; Martha 
Chamallas, Civil Rights in Ordinary Tort Cases: Race, Gender, and the Calculation of Economic 
Loss, 38 LoY L.A. L. REv. 1435 (2005); Martha Chamallas, Questioning the Use of Race-Specific 
and Gender-Specific Economic Data in Tort Litigation: A Constitutional Argument, 63 FoRDHAM 
L. Rev. 73, 75 (1994) [hereinafter Chamallas, Questioning]; Okianer Christian Dark, Racial In­
sults: " Keep Thy Tongue From Evil," 24 SuFFOLK L. Rev. 559 (1990); Richard Delgado, Words 
that Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REv. 133, 150 (1982); Rachel D . Godsil, Race Nuisance: The Rule of Law in the Jim Crow Era 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with The Howard Law Journal); Amy H. Kastely, Out of the 
Whiteness: On Raced Codes and White Race Consciousness in Some Tort, Criminal, and Contract 
Law, 63 U. CJN. L. REv. 269 (1994); Frank M. McClellan, The Dark Side of Tort Reform: Search­
ing for Racial Justice, 48 RUTGERS L. REv. 761, 780 (1996); Jennifer B. Wriggins, Toward a 
Feminist Revision of Torts, 13 AM. U. J. OF GENDER Soc. PoL'Y & L. 139 (2005) [hereinafter 
Wriggins, Toward]; Jennifer Wriggins, Genetics, IQ, Determinism, and Torts: The Example of 
Discovery.in Lead Exposure Litigation, 77 B.U. L. REv. 1025 (1997). 
24. Complete consideration of issues involving race and gender is beyond the scope of this 
Article. See infra Part II. See WELKE, supra note 7, and Wriggins, Toward, supra note 23, for 
related discussion. 
25. WELKE, supra note 7 {discussing hundreds of cases from the early twentieth century 
which identify the race of black plaintiffs). 
26. Related questions involve whether the tort system imposed different standards of liabil­
ity according to race. For example, did the courts through explicit doctrinal rules make it harder 
for blacks or whites to win tort cases? The preliminary answer is largely no; I believe many 
structural factors, such as the all-white legal system, probably made it more difficult for black 
plaintiffs to win on liability, but clear doctrinal rules were not discemable. 
Courts sometimes rejected race-based generalizations that white litigants argued should ap­
ply to help them win their cases. For example, in Patterson v. Risher, 221 S.W. 468 (Ark. 1920), a 
young white man was killed in a mine when a mule that was pulling the cart he was riding in got 
free and the cart smashed into a door. The deceased man's father argued that the mine superin­
tendent had created an unsafe workplace and that the mule driver, a black co-defendant, was 
"ignorant and reckless." /d. at. 469. Rejecting the claim, the court wrote that " in the absence of 
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this inquiry is a broad focus on the relationship between torts, includ­
ing tort compensation, and racial equality.27 
A threshold question at the intersection of race and torts is why 
and how black tort plaintiffs were able to achieve any access and suc­
cess in the civil justice arena, given the racism of the society and the 
legal system.28 One part of the answer must lie in the private enforce­
ment mechanism of torts, namely, contingency fee agreements. These 
agreements, which came into widespread usage in the late nineteenth 
century,29 are a widely used method of financing litigation in which 
the attorney advances the costs of the litigation and takes her fee and 
proof tending to show that it was negligence per sc to employ a negro driver ... it cannot be said 
that there was any testimony in the record to warrant a fmding that the appellee company was 
negligent in employing the negro, Hubbard , as driver." /d. at 471. In Taylor v. Atlantic Coast 
Line Rail Co., 59 S.E. 641 (S.C. 1907), the plaintiff, a white woman, argued that the railroad had 
a duty to escort her from the train station to a nearby boarding house through a crowd of unruly 
black men who were on the platform when she got off the train in the middle of the night, 
because the railroad should have reasonably anticipated danger to her by the mere presence of 
the crowd of black men. /d. at 642. The procedural status makes it hard to glean the exact scope 
of the duty ruling, but the court seemed to reject such a rule. /d. at 643-44. See also infra note 53 
(discussing whether courts imposed different standards of liability in Louisiana based on race of 
the plaintiff a nd reaching a largely negative conclusion). Further research may prompt revisions 
to this conclusion. 
27. There are several reasons for the primary focus ending at mid-century. Not only do 
published judicial opinions after 1950 generally lack the derogatory racial generalizations that 
appear in some earlier opinions, but after 1950, courts identify the race of the plaintiff less fre­
quently than earlier. See infra Part 11. 
28. The fact that some cases were brought and won by African American plaintiffs should 
not lead one to forget the equally, and possibly more, significant cases that probably were not 
brought. Part of the story about race and torts in the twentieth century is how the torts system 
has not provided remedies for much racially-influenced or motivated tortious (and criminal) 
harm such as lynching, an act very rarely prosecuted criminally. RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, 
CRIME, AND THE LAw 47-49 (1997). Kennedy defines lynching as "a killing done by several 
people acting in concert outside the legal process to punish a person perceived to have violated a 
law or custom." /d. at 42. Civil lawsuits seeking compensation for lynching also seem to have 
been very rare. JAMES HARMON CHADBOURN, LYNCHING AND THE LAw 78-80, 119 (1933) (dis­
cussing the indictment system and citing newspaper articles that discussed a total of eight civil 
cases, including one against a railroad for furnishing a special train to a lynch mob, for which the 
deceased 's widow received $7,000). Although 72.7% of reported lynchings in the United States 
between 1882 and 1968 were of black victims, the remaining lynching victims were white. KEN. 
NEDY, supra at 42. Other than Williams v. Great Southern Lumber, 277 U.S. 19 (1928), which 
involved a lynching of a white man, there did not seem to be reported appellate cases seeking 
compensation for lynching of black people. Doubtless, countless acts by whites towards African 
Americans, such as assaults and batteries that would otherwise be tortious, were not prosecuted, 
for a variety of reasons. The under-enforcement in this context must have been particularly 
extreme for many reasons linked to the racist caste system in which potential black plaintiffs 
lived. 
29. fRIEDMAN, HisTORY, supra note 19,. at 482; see also Wrrr, ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC, 
supra note 19, at 59-63 (noting that in urban areas after 1860 there were many lawyers, and the 
use of contingent fee agreements in personal injury cases was widespread). 
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expenses out of the proceeds.3° For the tort system to work as an 
effective deterrent, of course, it is essential that lawsuits are brought.31 
Lawyers who work on a contingency basis have incentives to select 
and aggressively pursue cases for which their clients are likely to win 
on liability and recover significant damages, whatever the race of the 
injured person. Many black clients, such as in the cases discussed in 
this Article, could not have paid a lawyers' hourly fee or advanced 
litigation expenses, but were able to bring tort suits. The fact that 
these suits were brought at all is in part a story of the success of con­
tingency fee agreements. 
African Americans may have been successful torts litigants be­
cause lawyers selected only the strongest cases to bring, taking into 
account factors such as liability, the nature of the defendant, and dam­
ages. Many of the defendants were railroad companies, which may 
have enabled lawyers to tap into widespread local anger at railroads 
for their unchecked power and the number of injuries they inflicted.32 
Individual claims brought by injured black people against large de­
fendants may not have fundamentally challenged the racial caste sys­
tem. However, some personal injury cases won by black plaintiffs 
were summarized by the National Association for the Advancement 
of Colored People in its magazine, The Crisis, suggesting that they 
were important statements of self-determination to many blacks at the 
time.33 
This discussion has laid the groundwork for further exploration of 
how the tort system valued harm to whites and blacks differently in 
30. For more recent discussion of contingency fee agreements, see Symposium, Contingency 
Fee Financing of Litigation in America, 47 DEPAUL L. R£v. 227 (1998). 
31. RicHARD A. PoSNER, EcoNOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 191 (4th ed. 1992). 
32. See WELKE, supra note 7, at 99-100 (describing widespread anger at railroads in the 
early twentieth century and at the height of Jim Crow). 
33. See, e.g., NAACP, THE CRISIS, Courts, May 1914, at 11 (reporting on five personal in­
jury awards won by black plaintiffs); /d., Courts, Aug. 1913, at 168 (reporting on $5,000 New 
York jury verdict for widow of black man against a man for causing the murder of her husband); 
ld., Courts, June 1913, at 68-69 (reporting on $300 award in a Mississippi court to "Pope Swint, a 
Negro, for discomfort on an excursion train," and a $20,000 jury verdict in Oregon to "John 
Mathews, a Negro, for personal injuries caused by the Oregon Independent Paving Company" ); 
ld., Courts, Feb. 1912, at 145 (reporting on New York court award of $10,000 to William Chinn 
against Ferro Construction Company for workplace injuries); /d., Courts, Jan. 1912, at 100 (re­
porting on $5,000 award to a "colored man" for injury to eyesight in North Carolina); Id., Courts, 
Jan. 1914, at 116 (reporting on a verdict of a former Pullman porter who received a verdict of 
$1,250 for personal injuries, and contrasting it with a large damage award affrrmed by the Su­
preme Court of Mississippi to a white woman for having been "compelled to remain in a coach 
in which there were three colored bishops"); /d., Courts, Jan. 1911 (reporting on verdict in false 
imprisonmen t case by black Pullman Porter George Griffin against Jim Brady) (discussed infra 
Part III). 
2005] 107 

H award Law Journal 
the first half of the twentieth century. Since most cases settle before 
trial, which has been true at least since the early twentieth century, 
information about how claims were valued in pretrial settlement is 
irnportant.34 Part I reviews evidence that claims adjusters, for claims 
against railroad companies, considered injuries suffered by black 
plaintiffs to be worth less than injuries suffered by white plaintiffs, and 
thus paid less to settle black plaintiffs' claims. Part II analyzes dam­
ages in wrongful death and survival cases decided by appellate courts 
in Louisiana from 1900 to 1949> by comparing cases brought by fami­
lies of blacks who were tortiously killed, to cases brought by families 
of whites tortiously killed. This section also discusses family and gen­
der issues arising from the structure and application of the relevant 
laws. Part III discusses a 1909 New York tort case, controversial at 
the time, where the trial judge explicitly endorsed devaluation of 
blacks' tort claims.35 Part IV suggests that past patterns have not dis­
appeared by briefly reviewing more recent contemporary evidence of 
devaluation linked with race in torts. 
PART I. RACE AND SETILEMENT OF RAILWAY 

INJURY CLAIMS 

Railroad injuries in the mid and late nineteenth century spurred 
the development of tort doctrine and tort practice.36 Thousands of 
lawsuits were brought against railroad companies in the late nine­
teenth and early twentieth century for a wide range of injuries, both 
mental and physical.37 In response, railroad companies organized de­
partments of "claims agents" to attempt to settle claims before trial.38 
Most claims never made it to trial or resulted in appellate opinions, 
but we~e often settled through claims agents. 39 
34. WELKE, supra note 7, at 112 (noting that by the beginning of the twentieth century, 
streetcar and railroad companies settled the large majority of claims against them before suit was 
even filed) . For anecdotal discussion of recent race and settlement behavior see McClellan, 
supra note 23. 
35. On the importance of trials in understanding law and culture, see Ariela J. Gross, Essay, 
Beyond Black and White: Cultural Approaches to Race and Slavery , 101 CoLU M . L. REv. 640, 
650-661 (2001 ) . On the importance of trials in establishing settlement benchmarks, see Samuel 
R. Gross & Kent D . Syverud, Don't Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a System Geared to Settlement, 44 
U .C.L.A. L. REv. 1, 5 (1996). See generally, WELKE, supra note 7 at 379·389 (listing trial tran­
scripts of cases brought against railroads by black plaintiffs). 
36. See supra nn. 19 & 20. 
37. See supra note 19; WELKE, supra note 7, at 82. 
38. W ELKE, supra note 7, at 106. 
39. l d . at 112. 
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Racial disparities surfaced through the payment of claims. Ac­
cording to historian Barbara Welke, a 1905 article in the Street Rail­
way Journal noted that the Philadelphia Rapid Transit Company kept 
elaborate files recording settlements by "nationality" and gender for 
use in valuing and settling future claims.40 The nationalities were 
"American," "Hebrew," "Irish," "Italian," "Negro," and "Other For­
eigners."41 In 1904,4.7% of the cases settled by the company involved 
black claimants, but only 2.3% of the damages paid went to these 
claimants.42 This disparity is pronounced, although more research 
about race and claims paying practices would be necessary before de­
finitive conclusions could be drawn. 
An influential text for railroad claims agents published in 1927 
endorsed r acial inequality in claims practices. It noted: 
The Constitution of the United States guarantees its citizens the 
equal protection of the law and provides that legally no difference 
shall be made between citizens on account of a difference in race or 
color . .. . But ... some of these guarantees have come to be greatly 
modified in the actual life of the nation.43 
The manual went on to explain that juries did not value the life of 
a black man equally with that of a white man, and to state "'[c]ertainly 
that is true in the South, where it is claimed that the true values in 
such matters are better understood than elsewhere.' "44 The manual 
discussed t he importance of keeping precise statistical records, by race 
as well as occupation, in determining the values for which later cases 
should be settled, noting that "'[a] brakeman is not always a brake­
man. A white brakeman is a brakeman; but a negro brakeman is most 
likely only a negro."'45 For whites, occupation was the dominant fac­
tor, while for blacks, race was the dominant factor, according to the 
manual. 
For blacks' claims to be devalued in the process of settlement, it 
did not even need to be true that juries valued black lives less than 
40. /d. a t 111. 
41. Id. 
42. ld. 
43. WELKE, supra note 7, at 111 (citing SMITH R. BRITIINGHAM, THE CLAIM AGENT AND 
His WoRK: INVESTIGATJON AND SETTLEMENT oF CLAIMs FOR PERSONAL INJURJES 270-271 
(New York 1927)). 
44. /d. 
45. /d. The manual went on to state, "the rude emigrant trackman is often viewed as sub­
human. ... Therefore, for statistical purposes these similar types should perhaps be kept in 
classes by themselves, although . .. to do so involves palpable and extremely serious difficulties." 
Id. 
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white lives, as the manual stated they did. Rather, if claims agents, 
black plaintiffs, and their lawyers all believed this, then black plaintiffs 
would have settled for lower amounts, regardless of whether juries 
had been in fact evenhanded. In other words, the perception that ju­
ries valued blacks' claims less than whites' claims could have created a 
self-fulfilling prophecy so that blacks' claims in fact were valued less in 
the process of settlement. One can also infer that the devaluation pro­
cess probably depressed the number of claims that injured black plain­
tiffs brought, since their claims would have been less profitable and 
thus less desirable for plaintiffs' lawyers to bring, than whites' claims 
for similar injuries. 
Taken together, this evidence indicates that claims by injured 
black people were valued less, and settled for less , than claims by in­
jured white people by at least some railroad companies. Informal, de­
centralized practices by private actors seem to have resulted in 
reduced compensation to black plaintiffs. In addition, railroads, 
streetcar companies, and other actors that followed their lead then 
had reduced incentives to prevent injuries to black people than to 
whites, knowing that they could more cheaply compensate blacks for 
their injuries. 
PART II. RACE AND WRONGFUL DEATH & SURVIVAL 

CASES IN LOUISIANA, 1900-1949 

A . Introduction 
This section examines 152 Louisiana appellate wrongful death 
and survival cases published between 1900 and 1949, comparing dam­
age awards to black and white surviving family members of people 
killed by torts. 46 In considering the broad topic E>f race and torts, fo­
46. For the discussion in this section, all reported Louisiana wrongful death and survival 
cases with Westlaw key numbers 117k95-99 from 1900-1949 were reviewed and included in a 
database. The key numbers covered the following areas under the general heading of "death 
actions:" measure and amount of damages awarded, in general (k95), statutory limits (k96), dis­
cretion of jury (k97), inadequate damages (k98), and excessive damages (k99). Jennifer B. Wrig­
gins, Database (August 24, 2005) [hereinafter Database) (on file with author). Computer 
searches such as "Negro" and " tort," and "colored" and "tort," and similar searches were also 
done in the Louisiana cases database and when a case revealed that a decedent was black, that 
case was included in the database. /d. The analysis covered 152 cases. Twenty-six cases were 
brought by black family members; the remainder, presumably, were brought by white family 
members. /d. See infra note 48 for discussion of racial identity in these cases. Between 1900 and 
1945, Louisiana had more reported wrongful death cases than many states, including Alabama, 
Arkansas, Kansas, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Ohio, Oklahoma, New York, Pennsylvania, Ten­
nessee, and Virginia, and fewer than Texas and Missouri. Memorandum from David Goldman 
(August 10, 2004) (on file with author). 
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cusing on damages in cases involving fatalities makes sense. All 
wrongful death and survival cases ultimately deal with the same in­
jury, death, and so comparison of damage awards and cases facilitates 
analysis of how race may have affected those damage awards. The 
'same injury' point should not be overstated. Different deaths have 
divergent effects on different families depending on factors such as 
the financial support provided by the deceased to the family, and the 
degree of emotional attachment between the deceased and the family. 
Nonetheless, the injuries are similar enough that careful analysis, 
which takes into account other factors besides race, is illuminating.47 
In addition to the fact that appellate courts generally mentioned 
the race of black tort plaintiffs,48 these cases are particularly fertile for 
researching race and valuation because of two features specific to 
Louisiana tort law. First, appellate review in Louisiana included re­
view of the facts, so that appellate courts discussed the amount of 
damages with more frequency and specificity than appellate courts in 
47. In a broader sense, of course, quantifying a human life or the loss caused by the loss of a 
family member is inherently problematic. The ongoing debates about the damage awards of the 
September 11th Victim Compensation Fund reflect the difficulty. See, e.g., Chamallas, supra 
note 13; Rabin, supra note 13. Yet part of the job of tort juries and judges is to quantify the 
immeasurable, despite the problematic and contested nature of the entire enterprise. 
48. Appellate cases in Louisiana, like cases in other states during this period, generally 
identified the race of black plaintiffs. See generally, WELKE, supra note 7, at 379-389 (discussing 
hundreds of reported civil decisions from the late nineteenth and early twentieth century which 
identify the race of black plaintiffs). 
For the purposes of this Article, the race of a decedent's family members is considered the 
race of the decedent. Where no mention of, or details pertaining to, a party's race was made, it 
is presumed the party was white. Inferences that a decedent was white sometimes are based on 
historical context and details in the decision, such as that the "decedent was in the waiting room 
for white passengers" when a flying timber struck and killed him. Taylor v. Vicksburg, Shreve­
port.& Pac. R.R., 91 So. 732,732 (La. 1922); see also Hebert v. Baton ~ouge Electric Co., 91 So. 
406 (La. 1925) (describing three year old child and "its negro girl nurse" asphyxiated by gas leak; 
inference that child was white); Eichorn v. New Orleans & C.R. Light & Power Co. 38 So. 526, 
529 (La. 1905) (describing children as attending "German pay school;" inference that decedent 
was white); Donaldson v. Riddling's Succession, 145 So. 804, 804, 805 (La. Ct. App. 2nd Cir. 
1933) (discussing "negro chauffer" of decedent and "negro boys" who reached the accident 
scene first; inference that decedent was white). For some cases, the inference that a decedent 
was white is based on the decedent's high-status occupation, see, e.g. , Gray v. Found. Co., 91 So. 
527 (La. 1922) (describing decedent as land engineer, salesman and lubrication expert; inference 
that decedent was white); Moore v. Jefferson Distilling and Denaturing Co., 123 So. 384 (La. Ct. 
App. 1929) (describing decedent vice president of Lucas E. Moore Stave Co.; inference that 
decedent was white). In WJ.lliams v. Brown, 181 So. 679 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1937), the dece­
dent's race was not listed but it seems probable, from the circumstances including the racial caste 
system separating white women from black men, DoLLARD, supra note 22, that she probably was 
black. The twenty year old decedent, a farmhand and housekeeper, was killed when traveling 
home from her mother's funeral, and she was a passenger in a truck with a "cargo of negroes 
(eight or nine in all)," id. at 682, 683. These are not cases where litigants challenge the racial 
identification made by the courts. See supra note 6. 
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many other states.49 Second, under Louisiana tort law, survivors of 
family members tortiously killed could seek damages for their own 
grief and emotional losses - an unusual feature in wrongful death stat­
utes.50 The ways appellate decisions measured and discussed damages 
for emotional loss and other types of harm provide insight into how 
race related to valuing injury in torts. 
Questions may be raised about whether Louisiana courts' treat­
ment of blacks' death claims was representative of other states' treat­
ment. Louisiana was typical in that it excluded black people from 
participating in the legal system and voting, its black population was 
poor on average, it passed segregation laws, and it experienced a cli­
mate of anti-black violence during the early twentieth century and the 
Jim Crow era.51 It was unusual in various ways, however, because it 
had an unusually large black population, it included the survivor's 
emotional losses in wrongful death damages, and its legal system 
stemmed in part from French civillaw.52 However, none of the ways 
49. See William E. Crawford, Life on a Federal/stand in a Civilian Sea, 15 M1ss. C. L. Rev. 
1, 2 (1994) (explaining that Louisiana appellate courts have the authority to: reverse jury find­
ings on the facts and render a contrary judgment; find a defendant negligent when a jury had 
exonerated her; and make its own finding of damages as long as there is record evidence to 
support it, because there is no constitutional right to a civil jury trial in Louisiana). 
50. DoBBS, supra note 4, at 807 (traditional wrongful death statutes allow recovery only for 
"pecuniary loss" of survivors). See generally, WJTT, AccJDE"-'TAL REPUBLIC, supra note 19; 
FRANK L. MARAJST & THOMAS C. GALLIGAN, JR., LouiSIANA ToRT LAw 423, § 18-5 (1996) 
(explaining that each wrongful death beneficiary under Louisiana law is entitled to a damage 
award that includes loss of love, affection, services, support, society, and grief). 
51. See Henry C. Dethloff & Robert R. Jones, Race Relations in Louisiana, 1877-98, in XI 
THE AFRJCAN-AMERJCAN EXPERIENCE IN LOUISIANA, PART B: FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO JIM 
CRow 501, 501 -17 (The Louisiana Purchase Bicentennial Series in Louisiana History, Charles 
Vincent ed., The Center for Louisiana Studies 2000) (1968) [hereinafter Dethloff & Jones, ExPE­
RIENCE] (recounting rise of segregation laws, exclusions of blacks from voting and jury service, 
and increased lynching and other violence in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth 
century in Louisiana). By 1900, for example, "(t)he vast majority of black voters was stricken 
from the rolls." Mark T. Carleton, "Judicious" State Administration, 1901- 1920 119, in XI THE 
AFRICAN-AMERICAN ExPERIENCE JN LouiSIANA, PART C: FROM JrM CRow TO CiviL RIGHTS 
119 (The Louisiana Purchase Bicentennial Series in Louisiana History, Charles Vincent ed., The 
Center for Louisiana Studies 2002) (1971). Stevenson's early twentieth century survey to court 
clerks of counties with blacks being more than half the population showed that few black jurors 
served in Louisiana. Supra note 22. One Louisiana respondent made the comment that "the 
very best of our Negroes [serve on juries] .... very good service, rather prone to convict in 
serious personal injury cases." /d. at 889. 
52. Louisiana was one of the states with the highest proportion of black residents during 
this period; in 1900 the state was 47.1% black; in 1950 it was 32% black. Campbell Gibson & 
Kay Jung, Historical Census Statistics on Population Totals By Race, 1790 to 1990, and By His­
panic Origin, 1970 to 1990, For The United States, Regions, Divisions, and States, Working Paper 
Series, No. 56, 2002, available at http://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/ 
twps0056.html. Louisiana is a civil code state, its law having derived initially from French Jaw 
rather than the common law. FRIEDMAN, HISTORY, supra note 19, at 171-173; see also MARAJST 
& GALLIGAN, supra note 50. 
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in which it was unusual suggest that its treatment of tort claims by 
black people was radically different from other states' treatment of 
blacks' tort claims. 53 
B. 	 Wrongful Death Actions and Survival Actions under Louisiana 
Law 
Louisiana's wrongful death and survival provisions frame our dis­
cussion.54 Wrongful death actions and survival actions are concep­
tually and legally distinct. Wrongful death actions are traditionally 
based on a model of lost financial support and are aimed at compen­
sating family members only for the financial loss caused by a loved 
one's death .55 As noted above, Louisiana's wrongful death law also 
53. Additional questions involve whether courts applied different standards of liability 
based on race and whether families of black decedents lost more frequently than families of 
white decedents in similar cases. The answer to whether more stringent standards of liability or 
specific doctrinal rules were applied to black plaintiffs seems to be no, although further analysis 
and study might show otherwise. One context that merits further analysis is the acceptance of 
self-defense in some circumstances. In two cases, the results of which seem debatable, the fami­
lies of black male decedents killed by white men were unable to recover because the killers 
established that they had used reasonable force. Wade v. Gennaro, 8 So. 2d 561, 561 {1943) 
(holding a proprietor of "negro barroom" [sic] was not liable for killing of drunken black man 
who threw bricks at him); Williams v. Shreveport Cab, 183 So. 120 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1938) 
(overturning trial court's decision and holding that a white cab driver who fatally shot "drunken 
negro man" who threatened him was not liable to his widow and child). Courts did not always 
accept the self-defense claims of white men who shot allegedly drunk or obnoxious black men, 
however, so it is difficult to draw clear conclusions. See Randall v. Ridgley, 185 So. 632 (La. Ct. 
App. 1939) {holding proprietor of barroom patronized by blacks liable for wounding obstreper­
ous black man with gun because proprietor's use of gun was unreasonable and increasing dam­
age award from $750 to $2,000); Young v. Broussard, 189 So. 477 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1939) 
(rejecting self-defense claim of night watchman who fatally shot drunken black man in the back 
and holding employer liable for the death). 
54. LA. Crv. CoDE ANN. art. 2315 (2005). See also MARAIST & GALLIGAN, supra note 50, 
at 415-26, §§ 18-1 to 18-9; Helmuth Carlyle Voss, The Recovery of Damages for Wrongful Death 
at Common Law, at Civil Law, and in Louisiana, 6 TuL. L. REv. 201,223 (1931-1932). In 1931, 
Voss wrote about the language of the LA. Crv. CoDE ANN art. 2315 ("Every act whatever of man 
that causes damage to another, obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it.") that "[t]his 
wide-sweeping article is the fundamental basis of tort law in Louisiana, and the breadth of its 
language has rendered it a persuasive invitation to everyone to come into the courts and make 
claims for which no other law of the state provides." Voss, supra, at 201 n.l. It was interpreted by 
the Louisiana Supreme Court in the mid-nineteenth century to not allow wrongful death or 
survival actions, making it necessary to amend it for those actions to be asserted. Hubgh v. New 
Orleans & Carollton R.R., 6 La. Ann. 495 (1851). Voss noted that the article was amended in 
1855 to provide that the tort claims of a person who died could still be asserted after the death of 
the claimant, and this 1855 provision was a survival provision, not a wrongful death provision. 
Voss, supra, at 221. But see, Witt, Origins ofModern Tort, supra note 19, at 755 n.S5 (listing 1855 
amendment as a wrongful death Jaw). Voss explains that the 1884 amendments allowed the 
survivors of a dead family member to file claims for losses connected to the death of a loved one. 
Voss, supra, at 222. This amendment was a wrongful death provision. MARAIST & GALLIGAN, 
supra, note 50. 
55. DOBBS, SUPRA note 4, at 807. 
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allowed compensation to family members for their emotionallosses.56 
By contrast to a wrongful death action, a 'survival' action is the con­
tinuation of a tort claim after death that the decedent would have had 
if he had lived, "with damages that he could have recovered had he 
been able to sue at the moment of death. "57 Survival actions typically 
include the decedent's pain and suffering and lost wages. 58 For exam­
ple, if a person died instantly from another's tort, his family would not 
be able to bring a survival action because he did not experience pain 
or suffering or lose wages before dying. 
If a person suffered before dying from a defendant's tort, rela­
tives could claim damages in three categories: loss of financial sup­
port; emotional loss; and losses the decedent could have claimed if he 
had not died, such as pain and suffering. 59 The first two of these ele­
ments would be compensable through a wrongful death claim, while 
the third would be part of a survival claim. Both would be included in 
the same lawsuit. Although these three categories are theoretically 
distinct, appellate decisions rarely divided damage awards into the dif­
ferent categories. Accordingly, it is often impossible to determine 
how much of a particular award was aimed to compensate for losses in 
a particular category. The facts discussed in the cases, however, often 
are helpful in such a determination. 
Wrongful death damage awards had the potential simply to re­
flect preexisting financial disparities between blacks and whites,60 be­
cause traditionally they were based on a model that evaluated 
financial support lost by the family as a result of the loved one's death, 
and blacks in Louisiana were poorer overall than whites.61 In other 
words, the death of a family member who earned low wages would 
cause a relatively small financial loss to the family , so that one would 
expect the wrongful death award for a low wage earner to be low. 
However, wrongful death and survival awards in Louisiana had the 
potential to go beyond reproducing existing economic disparities for 
56. MARAIST & GALLIGAN, supra note 50, at 423, § 18-5. 
57. Donas, supra note 4, at 805. Both wrongful death and survival actions now exist only 
when authorized by statute. /d. at 803. Survival statutes also provide that if a plaintiff has al­
ready instituted an action, the action continues after her death. /d. at 805. 
58. /d. at 805-806. 
59. MARAIST & GALLIGAN, supra note 50, at 422, § 18-4. 
60. See generally, Chamallas, supra note 23. 
61. See Dethloff & Jones, EXPERIENCE, supra note 51, at 503 (noting economically de­
pressed situation of blacks in late nineteenth century Louisiana). See generally, ARNOLD RosE, 
THE NEoRo IN AMERICA 68-70, 124-133 (1964) (summarizing information on widespread pov­
erty and low wages among blacks). 
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two main reasons. First, even if the financial support amounts lost by 
black family members were less than amounts lost by whites, the total 
awards should not necessarily have been less, because family members 
also could seek damages for emotional losses. These emotional losses 
would include loss of companionship and affection.62 Such emotional 
losses are not linked to financial loss or to race. Second, survival cases 
called for an exploration of how much the decedent suffered. Since 
pain and suffering are not correlated with earning power in any obvi­
ous way, and on some level, pain and suffering are universal despite 
linkages to gender and racial tropes,63 survival awards had the poten­
tial to go beyond existing financial disparities between blacks and 
whites. Thus, by allowing emotional loss damages to survivors and by 
allowing survivors to claim pain and suffering damages suffered by 
decedents, Louisiana law provided a framework for analyzing loss that 
went far beyond merely determining the financial loss caused by the 
loss of a loved one. 
C. Race, Gender, and Family Structure 
The wrongfuJ death and survival code provisions favored a cer­
tain family structure, that of a husband supporting his wife and legiti­
mate children, by recognizing harm to those family members when a 
husband was killed. To the extent that black families had different 
family structures, the law disadvantaged and, in many instances, ex­
cluded them from recovery. These statutory exclusions fom1 an im­
portant backdrop to the comparison of actual decisions in the next 
section. 
One way that wrongful death and survival law structured the rec­
ognition of harm was through strictures based on marriage and legiti­
.· macy. Louisiana did not recognize common law marriage,64 and 
62. MARAIST & GALLIGAN, supra note 50, at 423, § 18-5. 
63. For example, in the nineteenth century, the widespread assumption in medical circles 
and elsewhere was that black women, because of their race, were immune from the "extreme 
sensitivity" that characterized white women. MARTIN S. PcRNICK, A CALCULUs oF SuFFERING: 
PAIN, PROFESSIONALISM, AND ANESTHESIA IN NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA 156 (1985). 
Black women were thought to experience little suffering even during childbirth and major sur­
gery. /d. It was similarly thought that black men were virtuaJJy immune from pain. /d. at 155­
56; see also Verna L. Williams, Reform or Retrenchment?: Single-Sex Education and the Con· 
struction of Race and Gender, 2004 Wis. L. Rev. 15, 46-47 (2004) (describing history and racial 
and gender stereotypes); see also WELKE, supra note 7, at 131, 177-78; Martha Chamallas & 
Linda Kerber, Women, Mothers, and the Law ofFright, 88 MICH. L. REv. 814 (1990) (describing 
the association of white women with mental distress damages). 
64. Judith T. Younger, Marital Regimes: A Story of Compromise and Demoralization, To­
gether with Criticism and Suggestions for Reform, 67 CoRNELL L. REv. 45, 78 (1981). 
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"illegitimate" children, those born before or in the absence of a mar­
riage between their parents, could not recover for the death of their 
father or mother.65 Similarly, parents of "illegitimate" children could 
not recover for the loss of their children in tort.66 The code provi­
sion's exclusion of illegitimate children may have shaped the configu­
rations of claims brought by blacks. This is because a greater 
proportion of black children than white children were born out-of­
wedlock during the relevant period nationally, and in Louisiana.67 
Thus, the code provision probably made tort recovery impossible for a 
larger proportion of black children whose fathers or mothers were tor­
tiously killed than the proportion of white children that was barred 
from recovery.68 These same "illegitimacy" exclusions also precluded 
tort recovery for a larger proportion of black parents whose children 
were killed by torts than the proportion of white parents whose chil­
dren were killed by torts. 
The provisions also reflected gender asymmetry during much of 
the period discussed here, by not allowing widowers to bring actions 
for the loss of wives until amendments were passed allowing such re­
65. Youchican v. Tex. & P. Ry. Co., 86 So. 551 (La. 1920) (holding that a child of a Tunica 
Indian tribal member had no cause of action for his mother's death because parents had only 
been married according to customs of Tunica tribe and had never been formally legitimated); 
Thompson v. Vestal Lumber & Mfg. Co., 16 So.2d 594 (La. Ct. App. 1944) (holding that minor 
children of black decedent who lived with and were supported by him throughout their lives, and 
who were recognized by the community as his children, could not recover for his death under 
torts or workers compensation since parents were only married by "common law," and decedent 
never acknowledged children as his in writing as required by statute). The interpretation of LA. 
Crv. Com~ ANN. art 2315 to disallow claims brought by children outside marriage was struck 
down in Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968). The plaintiffs in Levy were the five children born 
out-of-wedlock to a black woman who may have died as a result of medical malpractice. See 
John C. Gra y, Jr. & David Rudovsky, The Court Acknowledges the Illegitimate: Levy v. Louisi­
ana and Glona v. American Guarantee & Liability Insurance, 118 U . PA. L. REv. 1, 2 (1969). 
· 66. Lynch v. Knoop, 43 So. 252 (La. 1907) (holding burden· of proof is on mother of de­
ceased child to prove she was legally married; if she failed to so prove she could not recover for 
loss of her child); Brown v. T.J. Moss Tie Co., 32 So. 2d 848 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1947) (holding 
that a mother of deceased black illegitimate son could not recover damages related to his death 
in tort or workers compensation). 
67. See Robert D . Plotnick, Seven Decades ofNonmaritaf Childbearing in the United States, 
(Working Paper, Feb. 2005). Data from 1935 to 1950 shows that a greater proportion of non­
white childre n than white children was born out of wedlock in Louisiana. Zachary Brandmeier 
(July 13, 2005) (unpublished memorandum on file with The Howard Law Journal). This data is 
organized as white versus non-white, and does not appear to be available for 1900-1935. /d. 
According to this data, 87.2% of the out-of-wedlock births in Louisiana in 1935 were to non­
whites, while 12.7% of the out-of-wedlock births in Louisiana in 1935 were to whites. ld. 
68. One factor that supports this inference is that where suits were brought for the deaths of 
adults, 43% of the cases for deaths of black adults were brought by their parents while only 16% 
of the cases for deaths of white adults were brought by their parents. Database, supra note 46. 
These adult decedents may have bad children who could not sue because they were born out-of­
wedlock. 
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covery in 1918.69 By their structure, the laws recognized harm and 
loss caused to a husband's family by his death, but completely denied 
that harm and loss were caused to a wife's family by her death. These 
gendered provisions, both passed in the nineteenth century, were part 
of a broad cultural move to define the paradigmatic family as one 
where a male breadwinner supported a stay-at-home wife.70 Given 
black women's historical roles in slavery and afterwards as working 
outside the family's home and providing financial support to the fam­
ily, this enduring paradigm was in many ways a "white" family 
model.71 
Wrongful death and survival laws, then, effectively created a par­
adigm decedent and paradigm dependents - a husband who provided 
for his wife and legitimate children. His death would create a finan­
cial and emotional loss for the wife and children that the law would 
recognize, if it was caused by a tort.72 To the extent that black families 
did not fit the paradigms, because wives were not financially depen­
dent on husbands, or because children were born outside of marriage, 
these provisions reduced or excluded recoveries. 73 
1. Averages, Medians, and Outliers: The Power of the Paradigm 
Comparing average and median damage awards to surviving fam­
ily members by race in Louisiana, black family members received 
much lower awards than white family members. The average award 
69. According to Voss, supra note 54, at 221, when Louisiana law was amended to allow for 
a survival action in 1855, only the children, widow, or parents could assert the continuation of a 
decedent's tort claim. Louisiana's wrongful death law, passed in 1884, continued the tradition of 
limiting recovery to widows while entirely excluding widowers. /d. at 222. In 1918, the legisla­
ture added language which seems to have been intended to allow husbands to file survival ac­
tions, but the drafting was not entirely clear. /d. at 240. The Louisiana Supreme Court 
interpreted the provision as continuing to allow widows but not widowers to bring both wrongful 
death and survival actions. Elias v. City of New Iberia, 69 So. 141 (La. 1915); Flash v. La. W. 
Ry., 68 So. 636 (La. 1915). 
70. Wrrr, AcciDENTAL REPUBLIC, supra note 19, at 717. As Witt notes, the initial wrongful 
death statutes passed in England allowed widowers to sue for the loss of a spouse, but U.S. 
versions of these statutes intentionally departed from the gender-neutral English model. /d. at 
720-721, 737-743, 736 n.54, 746-749. 
71. Twila L. Perry, Alimony: Race, Privilege, and Dependency in the Search for Theory, 82 
GEo. L. J. 2481, 2488 (1994) (describing how the notion of a protected, domestic sphere for 
women financially dependent on husbands has never applied to black women); Wuliams, supra 
note 63, at 45-47, 54-56 (describing black women's work during slavery and afterwards). 
72. This is not to suggest that the compensation generally provided was generous-it was not. 
Witt, supra note 19. 
73. For discussion of the racial and gender effects of the law of legitimacy in the inheritance 
context, see Mary Louise Fellows, The Law ofLegitimacy: An Instrument ofProcreative Power, 3 
CowM. J. GENDER & L. 495 (1993). 
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to black family members, $3,559, was less than half the amount of the 
average award to white family members, $8,245, during this period.74 
The same was true for median awards.75 Comparing the outliers-the 
highest and lowest award amounts - to surviving family members by 
race, black family members also were more poorly compensated. The 
two highest awards to black family members were all lower than the 
two highest awards to white family members.76 Similarly, the two low­
est awards to black family members were all less than the two lowest 
. awards to white family members.77 These are blatant disparities in 
damage awards by race. However, further exploration is necessary, 
because damage awards may have been affected by factual differences 
between cases, such as differing amounts of pain and suffering exper­
ienced by decedents, the relationship between the decedent and the 
survivors, or other factors. 
Widows and minor children of both races were the recipients of 
the two largest awards in each racial category.78 As such, courts ap­
plied the wrongful death and survival laws in a way that recognized 
and rewarded the favored family structure of paradigm decedents and 
paradigm dependents. In the highest award case with a black dece­
dent, Johnson v. Hibernia Bank, the appellate court awarded $9,000 
for the death of a fifty-five year old soap and perfume salesman, who 
74. In the cases reviewed, the average recovery for white family members was $8,245 , while 
the average recovery for black family members was $3,559 from 1900-1949. Database, supra 
note 46. 
75. Database, supra note 46. The median recovery for white family members was $7,021 , 
while the median recovery for black family members was $3,200 during the same period for the 
cases reviewed. /d. 
76. The two highest awards to surviving black family members were in Johnson v. Hibernia 
Bank & Trust, 1927 WL 3381 (La. Ct. App. Feb. 14, 1927) (awarding $9,000); and Foy v. Little, 
197 So. 313 (La. Ct. App. 1939) (awarding $8,294). The two highest awards to surviving white 
family members were in Albright v. Tatum, 37 So. 2d 888 (La. Ct. App. 1948) (awarding 
$29,000); and Alford v. La. & Ark. Ry., 38 So. 2d 258 (La. Ct. App. 1949) (reducing the award of 
$25,000 by $650 for workers compensation expenses previously paid). 
77. The two lowest awards to surviving black family members were given in Russell v. Tagli· 
alavore, 153 So. 44, 48 (La. Ct. App. 1934) (awarding $500); and Poindexter v. Serv. Cab Co., 161 
So. 40 (La. Ct. App. 1935) (awarding $839). The two lowest awards to surviving white family 
members were in Marshall v. La. State Rice Milling Co., 81 So. 331 (La. 1919) (awarding $2,000); 
and Constabel v. Miller, 131 So. 699 (La. Ct. App. 1933) (awarding $2,500}, and Hebert v. City of 
New Orleans, 163 So. 425 (1941) (awarding $2,500). 
78. See Johnson , 1927 WL 3381 (awarding $9,000 to a black decedent); Foy, 197 So. 313 
(awarding $8,294 to the widow and children of a black decedent). The two highest awards to 
surviving white family members were in Albright, 37 So. 2d 888 (awarding $29,000 to the widow 
and minor children of a white decedent), and Alford, 38 So. 2d 258 (awarding $25,000 to the 
widow and minor children of a white decedent, reduced by $650 workers compensation expenses 
previously paid). 
0 
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was also "a negro preacher," to his widow and two children.79 The 
appellate court articulated, in familiar terms, the tension between in­
dividual adjudication and treating like cases alike. It noted that "each 
case is considered independently on the merits and on the state of the 
facts peculiar to it, a due regard, however, being always had to the 
proper observance of a reasonable conformity of jurisprudence on 
general lines. "80 In other words, courts should be reasonably consis­
tent in order to assure fairness, but each case is unique so that rigor­
ous consistency is unnecessary. The second highest award for 
survivors of black decedents was for $8,294 for the loss of a thirty-two 
year old married truck driver who was a father of three minor 
children.81 
The two highest awards to family members of white decedents 
also involved paradigmatic decedents and paradigmatic dependents. 
The highest awards were for $29,00082 and $25,000 both to widows 
and minor children.83 Though widows and children recovered the 
largest awards generally, the damages awarded to black widows and 
children were significantly lower than those awarded to their white 
counterparts. 
The fa vored family model also seems to have played a role in the 
lowest awards for both races. In all of the low award cases, in each 
79. 1927 WL 3381, at *1, *2. The children were aged eighteen and seventeen. /d. at *1. He 
was killed by a collapsing wall, lived for thirty minutes with no evidence of pain and suffering, 
earned $130 a month and had a life expectancy of seventeen years. /d. 
80. /d. at *3. It awarded the widow $5,000 for loss of support, $500 for mental pain, $500 
for funeral expenses and $1500 for each of two children, which totaled $9,000. /d. The judgment 
at trial had been $7,500 for her loss of support and was otherwise the same. The appellate court 
found that that amount was excessive and reduced it to $5,000. /d. at •2. 
81. Foy , 197 So. 313. 
82. Albright, 37 So. 2d 888 (La. Ct. App. 1948). No details of decedent 's age, occupation or 
earnings, but an award of $14,000 for widow was affirmed "but an award of $8,000 for each of 
three minor children was reduced to $5,000 per child. ld. 
83. Decedent railway engineer who apparently died instantly from collision with another 
company's train was forty-eight years old, had twenty-two year life expectancy, and earned $215­
$225 per month. The court affirmed the trial court's award of $10,000 for widow which also 
accounted for "loss of support, companionship, love, care and protection,'' and $5,000 for each 
minor child, in addition to allowing workers compensation lien of $1,900 to be paid from the 
judgment. /d. In addition, there were several white decedent cases that resulted in $15,000 
damage awards. See, e.g., Gray v. Found. Co., 91 So. 527 (La. 1922) (awarding $15,000 for death 
of husband and father to his widow and four minor children for engineer who died instantly from 
boat falling on him); Feely v. National Packing Co., 75 So. 837 (La. 1917) (awarding fifty-four 
year old widow and thirteen year old son of a fifty-four year old "good husband and father" who 
earned $150 a month a total of $10,000 and $5,000 respectively after decedent experienced pain­
ful death following explosion. However, there was no specificity as to what part of award is for 
his pain and suffering); Leitz v. Rosenthal, 166 So. 651 (La. Ct. App. Orleans 1936) (awarding 
$15,000 to widow and two minor children for death of husband in car accident). These were well 
above the highest awards to survivors of deceased black family members. 
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racial category, the decedent either was not a husband/father or the 
survivors were not widows/minor legitimate children (or both). For 
example, the two lowest awards to family members of black decedents 
were $500 awards to widowers for the deaths of their wives.84 In each 
case, the spouses were estranged and not living together and the 
courts discussed this in their opinions. 85 
Following this pattern, the lowest awards to white family mem­
bers also were in families that did not fit the paradigms. The lowest 
award, $2,000, was made on behalf of an emancipated minor child for 
the death of his mother.86 The second lowest white award, $2,500, 
came in the death of a seventy year old mother in a suit brought by 
her adult, unmarried daugbter.87 In this context of awards to families 
that did not fit the paradigmatic structure, awards to white survivors 
far exceeded those to black survivors. 
2. Case Comparisons 
Another way to approach race and valuation is by comparing 
similar cases. Comparing contemporaneous cases that involve dece­
dents of different races indicates that race played a role in devaluing 
the claims brought by black family members relative to white family 
members' claims. 
84. Russell v. Taglialavore, 153 So. 44 (La. Ct. App. 1934) (awarding $500); Poindexter v. 
Serv. Cab Co., 161 So. 40 (La. Ct. App. 1935) (awarding $500 plus $339 to decedent 's father for 
medical and funeral expenses). 
85. Russell, 153 So. at 48-49; Poindexter, 161 So. at 41-42. 
86. Marshall v. La. State Rice Milling Co., 81 So. 331 (La. 1919). The lower court award of 
$3,000 to the minor child had included $1,000 for the mother's pain and suffering, but, on appeal, 
this was set aside because she died instantly. ld. at 333. The siblings were barred from recovery 
because they were adults and adult children can only sue under the code provision if there are no 
minor children. /d. The decision Jacks details about the mother's age, support or relationship to 
the child. Even though the decision refers to the child as emancipated, this does not seem to 
have been considered a bar to the assertion of the claims. See generally, Andrew Gates, et. al., 
Symposium: ContractUill Incapacity in the Louisiana Civil Code, 47 TuL. L. Rev. 1085, 1093, 
1098 (1973). There were three ways to become an emancipated minor during the relevant time 
period. One way was by notary signed by the father, or mother if the father was dead or not 
available, the second was by a judicial order of emancipation if the parents had treated the child 
cruelly, and the last was by getting married. /d. 
87. Constabel v. Miller, 131 So. 699, 700 (La. Ct. App. 1933). The mother died less than a 
month after a car accident. /d. Presumably, the mother did not support the daughter financially, 
because the decision does not specify. Of the $2,500 award, $644 consisted of funeral expenses, 
nursing expenses, and the daughter's loss of salary, which leaves $1,856 for the mother's pain and 
suffering, and the daughter's grief. /d. The appellate court noted how modest the award was 
and that the plaintiff did not appeal the award, id., perhaps hinting that they might have in­
creased it had they been asked. An additional $2,500 award was in a case involving a sixty-three 
year old sister killed in an accident who suffered twenty days before dying. Hebert v. City of 
New Orleans, 163 So. 425 (La. 1941). 
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One pair of cases involving black and white decedents, Hebert v. 
Baton Rouge Electric Co. and Kent v. Baton Rouge Electric Co., arose 
out of the same incident; comparison of these cases leads to a conclu­
sion that devaluing black parental grief or the support provided by the 
black decedent influenced the evaluation of the two deaths. 88 A gas 
outlet was left open in an apartment, and a three year old white child 
"and its negro girl nurse," a seventeen year old girl, died as a result.89 
No pain and suffering apparently were involved for either decedent, 
so the cases were "pure" wrongful death cases. The families of each 
decedent successfully sued Baton Rouge Electric Company. In each 
case, the same judge presided at trial, the lawyers for the plaintiffs and 
defendants were the same, and the defendants appealed to the Louisi­
ana Supreme Court. In the case involving the three year old white 
child, which was decided first, the court noted that large awards are 
generally not allowed for deaths of young children, citing a long string 
of precedents involving compensation for the deaths of young chil­
dren, and awarded $2,500 to each parent, a total of $5,000.90 In the 
later case involving the asphyxiated black nurse brought by the 
nurse's mother, the defendants tried to argue that the mother should 
only get $2,500, just like each of the parents of the three year old 
white child.91 But the court stated: 
[W]e do not regard the ruling on the amount of damages in that 
case as a precedent for this case. In the case [for the white three 
year old's death], there was no financial loss .... The daughter of 
the plaintiff in this case ... was 17 and a half years old, and the 
evidence is that she was already of some financial aid to her mother. 
She attended night school and was comparatively well advanced. 
Be that as it may, we cannot estimate grief and suffering in dollars 
and cents.92 
The mother of the black teenager was·awarded $5,000 while each 
parent of the white child was awarded $2,500 (a total of $5,000), so the 
88. Hebert v. Baton Rouge Elec. Co,. 91 So. 406 (La. 1922); Kent v. Baton Rouge Elec. Co., 
97 So. 433 (La. 1923). 
89. Hebert, 91 So. at 406. The child's gender was not specified. 
90. /d. The precedents included a case where the parents of a deceased black child killed by 
a neighbor's child playing with a gun were awarded $2,500 each, a totaJ of $5,000. Sutton v. 
Champagne, 75 So. 209 (1917) (awarding $5,000 to parents for death of nine year old black male 
child who was killed by neighbor's child playing with gun). For discussion of changes in valua· 
tion of children, see VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, PRICING THE PRICELESS CHILD: THE CHANGING So­
CIAL VALUE OF CHILDREN 140·165 (1985). 
91. Ken t, 97 So. at 346. The suit was brought by the mother and there was no indication of 
tbe father's locatjon. 
92. Jd. 
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black teenager's life did not in an obvious way count for less than the 
white child's life.93 
However, further reflection, particularly on the age of the dece­
dents, suggests a different conclusion. If it is assumed that a parent's 
grief can not be quantified, the threshold for a damage award might 
be a uniform amount for grief at the loss of a child. The next step 
would be to apply the model of lost financial support (which would 
not allow deaths of young children to result in large awards) and add 
an estimate of the financial support lost by the mother of the black 
teenager as a result of her child's death. Given that model, the award 
for the loss of the teenager, who was in school, working as a nurse, 
and providing some support for her mother, clearly should have been 
much higher than that for the loss of the three year old who was not 
providing any monetary support to its parents. 
In several other pairs of cases, such as the roughly contemporane­
ous Louisiana Supreme Court decisions in Pierre v. Powell Box Co.94 
and Vincent v. Morgan's Louisiana & T.R. & S.S. Co.,95 the devalua­
tion of black decedents' and survivors' claims is striking. In Pierre, 
where a black sixteen year old suffered a painful workplace injury that 
resulted in the amputation of his arm and his death eighteen months 
later, his parents were awarded $7,500 on appeal.96 The award was 
both for the decedent's suffering for the period between the accident 
and his death, and for the parents' loss of the "prospective support, 
companionship, and filial affection" provided by the decedent.97 Vin­
cent awarded $10,000 to the parents of a white sixteen year old who 
was fatally shot by a night watchman as he threw rocks at a train.98 
Although the ages of the decedents were the same, the facts concern­
ing pain and suffering were extremely different. The black decedent, 
93. We do not know if, for example, the child's father had also sued, whether the award to 
both parents would have been $10,000. 
94. 77 So. 943 (La. 1918). 
95. 74 So. 541 (La. 1917). 
96. Pierre, 77 So. at 947. A $2,500 verdict was deemed insufficient. /d. Louisiana passed a 
workers compensation statute in 1915. Jill Williford, Comment· Reformers' Regress: The 1991 
Texas Workers' Compensation Act, 22 ST. MARY's L.J. 1111, 1145 n.38 (1991). The Pierre deci­
sion does not specify when the injury was sustained but given the long period of suffering be­
tween the injury and the time when the decedent passed away, it seems plausible that the injury 
took place before the law went into effect. 
97. Pie rre, 77 So. at 947. 
98. 74 So. at 549. In several other cases where one parent had sued for the Joss of a child, 
the court awarded $5,000. Johnson v. Indus. Lumber Co., 60 So. 608 (La. 1912) (increasing 
award of $2,326.50 to $5,000 for mother of deceased minor son); Parker v. Crowell & Spencer 
Lumber Co., 39 So. 445 (La. 1905) (awarding $5,000 to father for loss of minor son). 
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Lucien Pierre, suffered for eighteen months before dying,99 while the 
white decedent did not suffer at all.100 Moreover, the degree of sup­
port provided to the family seems to have been different. The black 
decedent was working and apparently providing some support to his 
family,101 while the white decedent had never provided any support to 
his family .102 Comparing the pain and suffering of the decedents and 
the financial support they provided to their parents, Lucien Pierre 's 
parents should have received a much larger award than the parents in 
Vincent. Instead, they received an award that was significantly 
smaller. Lucien Pierre's suffering, the support he provided, and the 
grief of his parents seemingly counted for less.103 
Another vivid contrast is provided by two cases decided by the 
First Circuit Court of Appeals of Louisiana in 1939, Young v. Brous­
sard,104 and Thibodaux v. Culatta. 105 In Young, a twenty-nine year 
old unmarried black man, Pentard Young, was fatally shot by a night 
watchman at his former place of employment, suffering two days 
before his death.106 Thibodaux involved an adult, unmarried white 
male, Alcide Thibodaux Jr., who was killed instantly in a car acci­
dent.107 In Young, the parents were awarded $3,500; in Thidodaux the 
parents were awarded $5,040. Reviewing the decedents' suffering 
alone, one would expect a larger award for the parents of the black 
Pentard Young, who suffered two days, while Alcide Thibodaux Jr. 
died instantly.108 Yet, the award to Pentard Young's parents was a 
significantly lower amount. Differences in the amount of financial 
support provided by the decedents do not explain the differing dam­
age awards, because the amount that each decedent contributed to his 
99. Pierre, 77 So. at 945. 
100. Vincent, 14 So. at 544 
101. Pierre , 77 So. at 947. It appears he was providing support to his family based on the 
damages claimed by his parents. /d. 
102. Vin cent, 74 So. at 545. 
103. A later case that was factually similar to Vincent in that it also arose from a railroad 
employee fatally shooting someone provides an instructive comparison. Rousseau v . Tex. & 
Pac., 1926 WL 3375 (La. Ct. App. Aug. 2 , 1926). It was decided nine years after Vincent and 
Pierre; the decedent was a twenty-nine year old black man who provided support to his parents 
and suffered for several hours before dying as a result of a railroad detective's gunshot. The 
court awarded his parents only $6,000. Not only was he not engaging in illegal behavior at the 
time of the death, but he suffered before death and supported his parents, factors which should 
have made it a case for a significantly larger award than the $10,000 award for the rock-throwing 
sixteen year old who died instantly from a railroad employee's gunshot in Vincent. 
104. 189 So. 477 (La. Ct. App. 1939). 
105. 192 So. 712 (La. Ct. App. 1939). 
106. You ng, 189 So. at 478. 
107. Thibodaux , 192 So. at 712. 
108. You ng, 189 So. at 479. 
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parents' was almost identical, and in fact the contributions of the de­
cedent in Young were expected to continue while the contributions of 
the decedent in Thibodaux were about to cease.109 The suffering of 
the black decedent, his financial contributions, and his parents' grief 
and loss may have been what was in actuality devalued by the court.110 
These comparisons show that while, in theory, the Louisiana 
courts applied "a reasonable conformity of jurisprudence upon gen­
eral lines, "111 sometimes they departed from that rough consistency in 
ways that seem unmistakable from today's vantage point. In some 
instances , the suffering of black decedents, the economic support they 
provided to their families, and the grief of surviving family members 
seem to have counted for less than those of whites. 
D. Use of Segregated Precedents 
Appellate courts in cases involving black decedents sometimes 
determined the appropriate damage award based on the awards given 
in earlier cases involving black decedents.l12 These cases did not 
merely reference the race of the decedent, but actually used "black 
only" or racially segregated precedents to determine benchmarks for 
damage amounts. In other words, to these courts, the principle of 
treating like cases alike meant comparing deaths of black people only 
with the deaths of other black people. Deaths of white people, be­
109. In Young, 189 So. at 481, the black -decedent contributed three to four dollars a week to 
his parents' support and this was expected to continue. In Thibodaux, the white decedent con­
tributed fifteen dollars a month to his parents' support but this was expected to stop after his 
marriage which was supposed to take place a week after the accident that ended his life. 192 So. 
at 714. The First Circuit Louisiana Court of Appeals decided Thibodaux six months after Young 
but did not cite Young as precedent for the damage award. 
110. If we take into account activities that the decedent was engaging in at the time of his 
injury, we may have a partial explanation. We consider that the white decedent in Thibodaux 
was killed in a car accident while the decedent in Young was killed while drunkenly trespassing 
on his former employer's property. In Young, the night watchman who killed the decedent con­
vinced the lower court that he had acted in self-defense in shooting the decedent. Young, 89 So. 
at 480. This was rejected on appeal as implausible, but perhaps the decedent's more blamewor­
thy behavior may have been factored into the damage amount. However, returning to the 
$10,000 award for the rock-throwing white sixteen year old decedent in Vincent, his blameworthy 
behavior was not taken into account in reducing the award to his parents. Vincent, 14 So. at 549. 
Moreover, as discussed in the next section, the court in Young actually used racially segregated 
"black only" precedents to determine the low damage award. See infra Part II.D. 
111. Johnson, 1927 WL 3381, at •3. 
112. See, e.g. , Young, 189 So. at 481. But see Rousseau v. Tex. & Pac., 1926 WL 3375 •12-•13 
(La. Ct. App. Aug. 2, 1926) (citing cases of wrongful death awards to families of both black and 
white decedents in determination of amount of wrongful death award to parents of black man 
killed by defendant). This use of segregated precedents seems to have taken place almost only 
during the 1930s, and specifically in the Louisiana Fust Circuit Court of Appeals, for reasons 
that remain unclear. 
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cause they were excluded from the analysis, seem to have been con­
sidered another kind of harm. 
The most glaring example of this is Young v. Broussard, discussed 
above, where Pentard Young was killed by a night watchman.U3 The 
Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeals overturned the trial court's 
judgment for the defendant, and awarded Mr. Young's parents $3,500. 
In fixing this amount, the court cited three precedents involving dam­
age awards for a black decedent, first listing a $3,000 damage award 
for a black decedent114 and then going on to state: 
[I]n the [ ] case of Shamburg v. Thompson, Trustee, we affirmed an 
award of $3200 to the mother of a twenty two year old colored boy 
who was injured by the train at nine o'clock in the morning and died 
in the afternoon of the same day. The parents of a twenty-nine year 
old colored boy were allowed $6,000 for loss of love and affection, 
support, etc., and for the pain and suffering of the deceased in the 
case of Rousseau v. Texas & Pac. R. Co., et al. We have decided to 
fix the award in this case at $3500, which amount we believe to be 
proper under the facts and circumstances of this case.U5 
The court, referring to the adult decedents in some of the prece­
dential cases as " boy" even when the cases themselves did not, used as 
its frame of reference only cases involving black decedents. Those 
cases resulted in low awards, and although there were cases decided 
by the same court involving white decedents whose families received 
higher awards, the court did not cite them.116 In fact , the court actu­
ally skipped over a case that it had decided three years before involv­
ing the death of a white man in his twenties,117 which resulted in a 
higher award, and reached back thirteen years to a case involving the 
death of a black man in his twenties decided by a different appellate 
113. Edwards v. Texas & Pac. R. Co., 185 So. 111 (Ct. App. La. 1st Cir. 1938). Edwards 
involved the death of a twenty-nine year old man who "lived with his parents, colored tenants." 
/d. at 113. 
114. Young , 189 So. at 481. 
115. The trial court had ruled in the favor of the employer, accepting the night watchman 's 
argument that he had ftred in self-defense. The decedent had been laid off earlier that day and 
had returned, drunk , to his former employer's property repeatedly in the middle of the night. 
116. See, e.g. , Bodin v. Tex. Co. 186 So. 390 (La. Ct. App. 1939) (awarding $7,000 for the 
death of white seven year old child, $1,000 of which was for pain and suffering); Boykin v. 
Plauche, 168 So. 741 (La. Ct. App. 1936) (awarding $8,780, of which $780 was for funeral ex­
penses, to mother of twenty-three year old white son who was educated but had never supported 
her fmancially). The court states that losses of adult children are worth more fmancially than 
losses of younger children. /d. at 746. 
117. Boykin , 168 So. at 741. 
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court, which resulted in a lower award.118 The appellate court seems 
to recognize the harm to the victim and his family as a different, and 
necessarily, lesser harm than that which would befall a white family in 
comparable circumstances. 
Seve ral other decisions for the tortious deaths of black family 
members also based their awards only on earlier cases involving black 
decedents.119 However, the use of precedent is complex and the use 
of racially segregated precedents was not universal. For example, in 
the 1927 case Johnson v. Hibernia Bank & Trust,120 mentioned above, 
an award to a widow and children of the decedent contained a lengthy 
list of cit ations to damage awards in cases involving deaths of hus­
bands and fathers, both white and black.121 Johnson , in turn, was cited 
by three later cases, one involving a black decedent, and two involving 
white decedents.122 In both cases involving white decedents, Johnson 
was cited as useful authority, without mentioning the decedent's 
race.123 
The use of segregated, "black only" precedents shows that race 
mattered in creating frames of reference for damage determinations. 
The judges who used these precedents did not treat like cases alike, 
but actually treated harm to black people as different in kind from 
harm to white people, as reflected in their usage of an entirely differ­
ent frame of reference for damage determinations depending on the 
race of the litigants. The outcome of using a "black" frame of refer­
ence for damage determinations was lower damage awards for black 
families. The use of racially segregated precedent not only reflected 
the conceptualization of injury to blacks as different from and lesser 
than injury to whites, but it also ensured that injury to blacks would 
continue to be treated as less serious than injury to whites. 
118. Rousseau v. Tex. & Pac., 1926 WL 3375 (La. Ct. App. Aug. 2, 1926), 1926 WL 3375 
(awarding parents $6,000 for malicious killing of twenty-nine year old black decedent who sup­
ported his pa rents and suffered before dying,). 
119. See, e.g. , Coon v. Monroe Material Scrap Co., 191 So. 607 (La. Ct. App. 1939); 
Poindexter, 161 So. 40; Powe v. Morgans La. & Tex. R.R. & S.S. Co., 1927 WL 3992 (La. Ct. 
App. June 7, 1927). 
120. Johnson v. Hibernia Bank & Trust, 1927 WL 3381 (La. Ct. App. Feb. 14, 1927). 
121. ld. at *3-*5. 
122. Coon , 191 So. at 612 (La. Ct. App. 1939) (black decedent); Donaldson v. Riddling's 
Succession, 145 So. 804, 808 (La. Ct. App. 2nd Cir. 1933) (white decedent) ; Kern v. Knight, 127 
So. 133, 138 (La. Ct. App. 1930) (white decedent). 
123. Donaldson, 145 So. at 808; Kern , 127 So. at 137. 
126 [voL. 49:99 
Torts, Race, and the Value of Injury, 1900-1949 
E. Racial Generalizations and Differences in Tone 
This section analyzes two aspects of cases that may not directly 
affect the devaluation of injuries to black people, but may be impli­
cated in it. The first is the use of racial generalizations; the second is 
differences in judicial tone. 
In several cases, judges articulated negative generalizations about 
blacks and indicated that the decedent either departed from or acted 
consistently with such generalizations to justify the amount of their 
award. By contrast, in no case did judges articulate generalizations 
about white people and indicate that the decedent either departed 
from or acted consistently with such generalizations. Blackburn v. 
Louisiana Railway & Navigation Co.124 presents perhaps the most 
vivid example of how racial generalizations about a black decedent 
resulted in a low damage award to his family. In that case, Justice 
Provosty of the Louisiana Supreme Court reduced a verdict for the 
mother of a thirty-one year old brakeman from $6,250 to $1,985 with 
the following words: "Considering the well-known improvidence of 
the colored race, and the irregular life these colored brakemen lead, 
we think t hat upon this evidence a regular allowance of $15 per month 
would lean more to the side of liberality to the plaintiff than 
otherwise. "125 
In McNeil v. Boagni, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit 
described the black decedent, a laborer, in the following terms: "The 
proof shows that all he earned went to his family to which he was 
devotedly attached; that he had no vices, did not drink or gamble, 
unusual qualities for a colored man. " 126 Noting that his remaining life 
expectancy was over nine years and that although he was sixty-nine 
years old he was "very vigorous, remarkably well preserved and effi­
cient," the court increased the widow's award from $1,750 to $2,000.127 
In Powe et al. v. Morgan's La. & Tex. Ry Co., the defendant railway 
company argued that the plaintiff widow had deserted her husband 
and that since she had been unfaithful to him, she was not entitled to 
recover damages. 128 The trial judge, in language that the appellate 
court later approved, rejected this argument, saying: "It is true that 
the plaintiff may have been guilty of indiscretions, but such indiscre­
124. 54 So. 865 (La. 1910). 
125. /d. at 869. 
126. 153 So. 352, 356 (La. Ct. App. 1934). 
127. /d. 
128. Powe v. Morgans La. & Tex. R.R. & S.S. Co., 1927 WL 3992 (La. Ct. App. June 7, 1927). 
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tions can be considered as mostly characteristic of the colored race. 
There is no positive testimony to convince me that she had abandoned 
her husband and was living as the concubine of another. "129 In 
Shamburg v. Thompson, the court referred to the twenty-two year old 
decedent as "boy."130 
In some cases courts seemed to use a particularly warm tone in 
connection with the deaths of white men. For example, in Horrell v. 
Gulf & Valley Cotton Oil Co., the decedent suffered for about twenty 
four hours, and the court wrote: 
His clothing was literally burned from his body by the acid. It is 
practically impossible to place a monetary value on human life, and 
it is quite impossible to value in dollars and cents human suffering. 
No one knows whether the young man, had he lived, would have 
soon married. How long he would have continued to assist in the 
maintenance of his parents we are unable to say. We have consid­
ered many awards sanctioned by us and by the Supreme Court in 
other cases. We find it unnecessary to discuss items making up the 
respective claims of the two parents. Suffice it to say that, having 
given due consideration to many former awards, and in view of the 
exemplary habits of the young man and his most excruciating suffer­
ing during the last hours of his life .... 131 
The court awarded $5,000 to each parent.132 In Blackburn, where 
the damages to the brakeman's family were significantly reduced be­
cause of the purported "irregular life" led by "colored brakemen," the 
decedent's head had been crushed in a grisly manner, but the court 
calculated a small amount for his pain and suffering because he died 
so soon after.133 Though the facts of these two cases were different, 
the description of the decedent's death in Blackburn could have been 
more vivid and sympathy-evoking t~an it was, and perhaps, the dam­
age amount would correspondingly have been more substantial.134 
129. /d. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's award of $1,500 for the widow and 
$3,000 for each child, noting also that the husband and wife had written letters to each other and 
that it was common for husbands and wives not to keep letters they sent one another, so no 
inference should be drawn from the fact that none of the letters were produced. /d. 
130. 186 So. at 618-19; see also Young v. Broussard, 189 So. 477, 481 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 
1939). 
131. Horrell v. Gulf & Valley Cotton Oil Co., 131 So. 709,716 (La. Ct. App. 1930) (emphasis 
added). Another example is the tone employed by the court in Boykin, 168 So. at 746, stating 
decedent was "splendidly equipped mentally and with every prospect of success"). 
132. Horrell, 131 So. at 716. 
133. Blackburn v. Louisiana Ry. & Navigation Co., 54 So. 865, 869-70 (La. 1910}. 
134. This is not to suggest that courts were always callous towards claims for black suffering; 
for example in Pierre v. Powell Box Co., 77 So. 943, 946 (La. 1918), the Louisiana Supreme 
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In Thibodaux v. Culotta,13s mentioned above, where Alcide 
Thibodaux Jr. was killed instantly in a car accident, the appellate court 
used flowery language unmatched in cases involving black decedents: 
"we realize that it is impossible to compensate the parents fully in 
dollars and cents for the great mental suffering and heartbreak occa­
sioned by the tragic death of their son."136 In Kent v. Baton Rouge 
Electric Co., involving the gas asphyxiation of the black teen-aged 
nurse, the court simply said of the mother's grief, "we can not esti­
mate grief and suffering in dollars and cents. "137 
The impact of the appellate courts' difference in tone towards 
blacks and whites, and of derogatory generalizations about blacks, is 
difficult to quantify, and it should not be considered in isolation from 
what appellate courts actually did regarding blacks' and whites' 
claims. The language the courts sometimes used suggests that racist 
norms affected the decision-making process to the detriment of black 
plaintiffs. 
F. Conclusion 
The wrongful death and survival decisions discussed here present 
a picture that, while more favorable to black plaintiffs than many 
might expect, does not resemble equal treatment under the law. The 
appellate courts in wrongful death and survival cases often ruled in 
favor of black plaintiffs, but black plaintiffs' claims were often deval­
ued relative to whites' claims. The average and median awards for 
black families were less than half those for white families. Awards for 
the death of a husband who supported his wife and legitimate minor 
children-the favored family structure-were the highest in each ra­
cial category. Yet, awards for deaths of black decedents were on aver­
age much lower than awards for the deaths of whites, even in cases 
brought by black widows for the death of a husband and father of the 
couple's children. In addition, the favored family paradigm itself priv­
ileged a family model that was more common for white families than 
for black families, with a consequence that black family members who 
lost a loved one from a tort would be less likely to be able to seek 
recovery for the death than white families who lost a loved one. 
Court found that the damage amount for the young man's eighteen months of suffering between 
the injury and death was inadequate, using quite sympathetic language. 
135. 192 So. 712, 712 (La. Ct. App. 1939). 
136. /d. at 715. 
137. 97 So. at 346. 
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While the law itself provided ample opportunity for courts to evaluate 
a loved one's loss in a way that went far beyond monetary contribu­
tion provided by the decedent, the law as applied seems to have re­
flected traditional assumptions that placed the highest value on 
financial support provided by the husband to his widow and legitimate 
children. Lower value seems to have been placed on emotional losses 
suffered by survivors. Comparison of roughly contemporaneous cases 
featuring decedents of different races shows that the financial contri­
butions of black decedents, their pain and suffering, and the grief of 
black survivors, at times, were weighed more lightly than similar 
harms suffered by whites. Moreover, courts' use of "black only" 
precedents to make damage decisions about the value of black dece­
dents' claims, at the same time that they ignored precedents involving 
white people's deaths, shows that racial categorization contributed to 
blacks' claims being valued less than whites.' Finally, the courts' use 
of racial generalizations about blacks and the differences in tone and 
rhetoric further exemplify how race was implicated in the valuation of 
tortious injury. The torts system, through the process of individual­
ized adjudication, violated the principle that similar injuries should be 
treated similarly. 
PART III. RACE, STATUS AND HARM: "A COLORED MAN 

... HAS NOT THE SAME AMOUNT OF INJURY 

UNDER ALL THE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT A 

WHITE MAN WOULD HAVE." 138 

One of the most conspicuous departures from the principle of 
treating like cases alike was a New York case, Griffin v. Brady, which 
was notorious at the time, but has since receded into obscurity. 139 The 
New York Times on May 22, 1909 carried the headline, 'Negro Not 
Equal to White: Suffers Less Humiliation in False Arrest, Court 
Holds.'140 George Griffin, a black Pullman porter, had sued Daniel 
Brady, President of Brady Brass Company, for false imprisonment 
damages because, he claimed, Brady had "maliciously caused his ar­
rest on the charge of having stolen a card case containing $20, several 
138. Negro Not Equal to White: Suffers Less Humiliation in False Arrest, Court Holds, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 22, 1909, at 16 (hereinafter Negro Not Equal to White) . 
139. Griffin v. Brady, 117 N.Y.S. 1136 (App. Div. 1909) (mem.), affd per curiam, 118 N.Y.S. 
240 (App. Div. 1909) (denying motion for reargument and stating that its affirmance "is not to 
be taken as an approval in any degree of the expression by the trial court of its views in colloquy 
with counsel."), affd, 126 N.Y.S. 1130 (App. Div. 1910) (mem.). 
140. Negro Not Equal to White , supra note 138, at 16. 
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railroad passes, and valuable papers, but the next day, when the case 
was investigated by a Magistrate, he was discharged." 141 The events 
took place in MontreaJ.l 42 A jury in New York found Brady liable 
and awarded Griffin $2,500.143 After the verdict, the trial judge, for­
mer Congressman Philip Dugro, told Griffin's lawyers "that he would 
set the verdict aside unless their client would consent to a reduction of 
the amount of damages to $300. "144 When they refused, the judge 
carried out his threat, and this decision was affirmed in three separate 
appellate orders, none of which discussed its substance.145 Griffin 
then apparently accepted the reduction of damages to $300. 
Justice Dugro's courtroom comments, with a reporter present, at­
tracted attention. Referring to Griffin, Justice Dugro reportedly said: 
He was a porter, and while he is just as good as the President of the 
United States, and if he is imprisoned wrongfully he should be paid 
for it, it would be a bad argument to say that he is just as good in 
many senses. He would not be hurt just as much if put in prison as 
every other man would be. That depends on a man's standing, what 
his circumstances are, and, if he is a colored man, the fact that he is 
a colored man is to be considered ... [I]n one sense, a colored man 
is just as good as a white man, for the law says he is, but he has not 
the same amount of injury under all circumstances that a white man 
141. /d. Daniel Brady himself went on to become a charter member of the New Jersey 
Chamber of Commerce. N.J. Chamber of Commerce, Who are we? NJ Chamber of Commerce 
Charter Members: 1911-1913, http://www.njchamber.com/Membership/chartermernbers .htm (last 
visited April 22, 2004). Daniel Brady's brother, the New York Times reports, was "'Diamond 
Jim' Brady, one of the best known financiers of the 'gilded age."' Negro Not Equal to White, 
supra note 138, at 16. 
142. Negro Not Equal to White, supra note 138, at 16. Presumably Griffm sued in New York 
because Brady and he were New York residents. There is no way of knowing, of course, whether 
Griffin would have been so promptly cleared of misconduct had the events of the case not taken 
place in Montreal but had taken place in the United States. 
143. /d. ~ 
144. /d.; see also Infoplease, Dugro, Phillip Henry, (1855-1920), at http://www.infoplease. 
comlbiography/us/congress/dugro-philip-henry.html (last visited Aug. 25, 2005}. 
145. Griffin , 117 N.Y.S. at 1136; 118 N.Y.S. at 240; 126 N.Y.S. at 1130. Griffin probably could 
have appealed to the New York Court of Appeals but may have felt that it would be unavailing. 
The appellate division denied Griffin 's motion for reargument, stating that "the affirmance by 
this court without an opinion of an order of the trial court, made in the exercise of its discretion, 
setting aside the verdict of a jury, is not to be taken as an approval in any degree of the expres­
sion by the trial court of its views in colloquy with counsel." Griffin, 118 N.Y.S. at 240. The 
order also stated, "All that is determined is that this court has declined to reverse an order made 
in the discretion of the Trial term, directing a new trial, upon which new trial all the issues are to 
be presented de novo to another jury." /d. This order is not a model of clarity. Paraphrasing, 
the trial court had the discretion to set aside a jury verdict and order a new trial, and the appel­
late division affirmed that exercise of discretion. However, still paraphrasing, the appellate divi­
sion was not intending to endorse the trial court's expression of his views, in his discussion with 
Griffin's lawyer. It is not entirely clear exactly what the appellate division is not endorsing. 
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would have. Maybe in a colored community down South, where the 
white man was held in great disfavor, he might be more injured, but 
after all that is not this sort of a community. In this sort of a com­
munity I dare say the amount of evil that would flow to the colored 
man from a charge like this would not be as great as it probably 
would be to a white man.146 
The New York Times published a critical editorial on the case, 
which stated that the judge's decision to reduce Griffin 's verdict 
"made talk all over the country. Nobody could deny that there was a 
sort of truth in it, and yet almost everybody had an instinctive realiza­
tion that somehow the thing was, or ought to be, wrong. It was, in 
short, the indictment and condemnation of a race, without regard to 
its better part or its exceptional members, and that is repugnant to the 
modern sense of equity."147 The editorial also chided the appellate 
court for the ambiguity of its comments about Justice Dugro's collo­
quy with counsel, since the comments could be read either as indirect 
criticism of Justice Dugro's views or the fact that he expressed those 
views.148 The Times criticism seemed to echo W.E.B. Dubois' notion 
of a "talented tenth" of black Americans whose qualities and achieve­
ments deserved the respect of white Americans.149 
More incisive criticism came from an article in the Virginia Law 
Register, later reprinted in the Central Law Journal, entitled A New 
York Court Draws The Color Line.15° Calling the decision "remarka­
ble," the article sarcastically noted: 
We are exceedingly glad that this decision came from a court of 
justice north of the Potomac. Had it occurred in a southern state we 
can imagine the agony of mind that it would have cost the New 
York Evening Post and a few other journals of that character. We 
146. /d. A Boston newspaper quoted Justtce Dugro somewhat differently, including "I think 
if you were to take the Mayor of the city and arrest him he would feel very much more humili­
ated than this porter, from the fact that he was the Mayor and not a colored man, for if he were a 
colored man he might not feel quite as much humiliation and shame." Negroes' Feelings 
Cheaper- Judge Says White Man Is Entitled to More Damages, BoSTON PoST, May 22, 1909. 
Much of the Boston paper's quote is identical to the NEw YoRK TIMES quote; it is not clear 
whether the New York Times omitted the Justice's quote about the Mayor or if there is a conflict 
in the two accounts. . 
147. Editorial: No Light on the Main Point, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 1909, at 6. 
148. /d. The case was also mentioned critically by Stevenson, supra note 22, at 905, in a way 
that suggests the author expected more public criticism of it would ensue. 
149. W.E.B. Du BOis, THE TALENTED T eNTH , IN THE NEGRO PROBLEM 33 (Humanity 
Books 2003) (1903). 
150. A New York Court Draws The Color Line, 69 CENT. L.J. 118 (1909) [hereinafter Color 
Line). The Central Law Journal was a weekly journal for practicing lawyers, published in St. 
Louis, Missouri starting 1874, which mainly contained information about cases in the Mississippi 
Valley. 1 CENT. L J. l (1874). 
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do no t believe that in our Court of Appeals the court would have 
listened for one moment to an argument based upon the color of 
the suitor before it.151 
The article ridiculed the decision, stating that the court would have 
had to go back to the fourteenth century to find support for it, and 
that color should have been irrelevailt.152 It said that if punitive dam­
ages were at stake as in this case, a plaintiff's "station" should not be 
relevant to damage determinations.153 
It is impressive that in 1909, a jury awarded $2,500 to Mr.Griffin 
against the President of Brady Brass Company for what were essen­
tially mental distress and dignitary damages.154 Yet, it is equally note­
worthy that the reduction in damages, based solely on the plaintiffs 
race , was upheld by the New York appellate courts. 
The trial judge's justification, and the controversy it created, illu­
minate enduring tensions linked with torts and race. The trial judge 
attempted to avoid the basic principle of formal equality that similar 
injuries should be treated similarly, by categorizing the injury to a 
black person caused by false imprisonment as different in kind from 
an injury to a white person caused by the same tort. He justified the 
damage reduction by imagining a comparison between the actual situ­
ation and a hypothetical one. The actual situation (black plaintiff 
falsely imprisoned) and the hypothetical one (white plaintiff falsely 
imprisoned) were not the same, in his analysis. Although the defen­
dant's actions were tortious in both situations, a different injury oc­
curred and therefore a difference in treatment was called for because 
151. Color Line, supra note 150, at 119. 
152. /d. The article cited Bodrengam v. Arcedekne, "which was reported in Year Book 30 
and 31, Edw. I, page 106, decided in the year 1302 ... !' /d. Justice Brumpton apparently stated 
in that case, " that a buffet given to a knight or·noble was as bad as a wound given to one of the 
rabble." /d. A "buffet" in this context is " a blow or cuff with or as if with the hand." THE 
AMERICAN HERITAGE DicriONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed. 2000). The article 
noted that "we imagined the world had advanced a little since that time and that the Jaw knew 
no man 's color when he was impleaded in the courts." Color Line, supra note 150, at 119. The 
article went on to say that that " we are inclined to think that the majority of the court was right 
and that in fixing damages the station of a man in life should be the guide in the ascertainment. 
but we do not think that the Jaw books have always sustained this in questions where exemplary 
damages are allowed." ld. The article noted that Griffin was purely about exemplary damages, 
and under Virginia law, once some damage was established (as was clearly the case here) it was 
up to the jury to determine them and the amount could not be reviewed unless they were "influ­
enced by improper motives." Jd. 
153. /d. 
154. See supra note 22, regarding racial composition of juries. Pullman porters were not paid 
much, so it is likely that the litigation was fmanced by contingency fee agreement. LARRY TYE, 
RISING FROM THE RAILS: PULLMAN PORTERS AND THE MAKING OF THE BLACK MIDDLE CLASS 
88 (2004). See also WELKE, supra note 7. 
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of the different race of the victim in each situation. His statements 
about different damage amounts based on race, then, supposedly did 
not violate the general principle that similar injuries should be treated 
similarly, because the injuries were not similar. 
Moreover, the judge's decision, by tying damage amounts to 
group-based concepts of race and status, ignored the tort principle 
that injuries should be evaluated individually.155 Part of the purpose 
of the false imprisonment tort is to compensate individual victims for 
personal humiliation and insult.156 Thus, the judge's decision that this 
victim did not suffer as much as the jury thought he did, runs directly 
contrary both to the purpose of this tort and to the principle that the 
damages for this tort are necessarily subjective. 
The reasoning that justified the result was circular, rather like the 
use of segregated precedents to determine damages. The generalized 
inferior caste status of blacks was the reason for them to receive less 
compensation than whites when injured by the same torts.157 Mr. 
Griffin was inferior in the first place, and so damages awarded to him 
should be less than those of a white man who, by definition, had a 
higher status than a black man, according to the judge. The fallacy of 
this argument, pointed out by the Virginia Law Register article, is that 
[t]he injury to a man for false imprisonment might be far greater in 
the case of a humble man working for a daily wage than in the case 
of a millionaire. The fact that the former had once been in prison, 
although innocent, might cause him to have great trouble in secur­
ing a position such as a porter upon a Pullman car .... The injury, 
therefore for false imprisonment to a porter on a Pullman car, even 
though he was colored, might be far greater than to a Vanderbilt or 
a Rockefeller.158 
Moreover, the injury to Mr. Griffin's actual sense of dignity might 
have been far greater than the injury Mr. Brady would have suffered; 
but at any rate the jury had the task of making that determination. 
One reason that the case received widespread attention is that it 
clearly deviated from two familiar ideas which were central to torts 
even in times of particularly virulent racism: These are the ideas that, 
155. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
156. W. PAGE KEETON, ET. AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 48 (W. Page 
Keeton, 5th ed. 1984). 
157. Race-specific economic earnings projections, which project that blacks will earn Jess, 
because they have earned less, are sometimes used in tort litigation to this day. See, e.g., 
Chamallas, supra note 23. 
158. ld. 
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first, damages should be assessed with reference to the individual's 
situation; and second, similar injuries should be treated similarly. In­
stead of assessing the damages with reference to the individual's situa­
tion, with only a sweeping glance at whether damages are consistent 
to satisfy (or seem to satisfy) equal treatment principles, the judge 
instead insisted that damages correspond to race and status. In the 
scores of appellate decisions read for this Article involving tort claims 
brought by African American victims in the twentieth century, explicit 
justifications for compensating white plaintiffs more than African 
American plaintiffs because of race are rare. 159 Trial judges, of course 
may have made similar remarks that were not reported. Nonetheless, 
racial inequality has appeared more commonly in subtler guises, such 
as in individualized adjudication or settlement practices that collec­
tively resulted in overall lower awards for blacks than for whites.160 
The tort principle that injuries should be evaluated individually, com­
bined with the principle that similar injuries should be treated simi­
larly, render unacceptable, or at least controversial, broad statements 
that the race and status of an injured person should correlate with the 
amount of damages. 
PART IV. POST-1949 EVIDENCE 
Tort decisions no longer reference the race of the parties, and 
formal mechanisms of racial exclusion from the legal system are no 
longer allowed. Debate persists about how much difference race and 
racism continue to make in the U.S. legal system. Issues pertaining to 
tort litigation in general, much less issues of race in tort litigation, are 
extremely difficult to study because of challenging empirical issues.161 
In depth consideration of contemp<;>rary issues pertaining to race and 
159. One similar instance is in Blackburn v. Louisiana Ry. & Navigation Co., 54 So. 865, 869 
(La. 1910) (reducing damage amount because of " the well-known improvidence of the colored 
race , and the irregular life these colored brakeman lead . ..."). 
160. See supra Part. I; Part. II.B.l. 
161. See Galanter, supra note 18; Saks, supra note 18; Schwartz, supra note 18; see also Au­
DREY CHIN & MARK A . PETERSON, DEEP PocKETS, EMPTY PocKETs: WHo WINS IN CooK 
CoUNTY J u RY TRIALS vili (1985) (analyzing effect of race on civil justice system and verdicts); 
MARK A . PETERSON & GEORGE L. PRIEST, THE CJVIL JURY: TRENDS tN TRIALS AND VERDICTS, 
CooK CouNTY, lLLJNOJS, 1960-1979 1, 1 (1982) (noting that most information about civil jury 
trials is based on anecdotal evidence). In a 1990 Washington State report, average settlements 
for minorities with asbestos claims were lower than for non-minorities, but the report itself ac­
knowledges that more information is needed to understand the significance of that outcome. 
JusTICE CHARLES Z. SMrTH, WASHINGTON STATE MINORITY & JusTICE TASK FoRCE FINAL 
REPORT 11 (1990); cf Chamallas, supra note 8, at 463 (noting that "[g]ender and race have 
disappeared from the face of tort law" but arguing that they remain significant). 
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torts is beyond the scope of this Article, but some general observa­
tions will be made.162 
The most systematic published study of civil trials and race ana­
lyzed 9,000 civil jury trials in Cook County, Illinois, from 1959-1979.163 
It found that "race seemed to have a pervasive influence on the out­
comes of civil jury trials. "164 When black plaintiffs won, they "re­
ceived smaller awards, only 7 4 percent as much as white plaintiffs 
received for the same injury."165 The pattern of blacks' claims being 
devalued, which we observed in the Louisiana cases, appears to have 
continued. The Cook County study noted that "[t]he disadvantage for 
black plaintiffs did not lessen in recent years."166 However, the period 
this study covered ended about twenty five years ago. The report also 
noted that blacks were underrepresented in proportion to their popu­
lation in Cook County as both plaintiffs and defendants, suggesting 
that perhaps "[b ]lacks might have been more reluctant to file lawsuits­
and lawyers might have been less willing to take their cases-if they 
foresaw a lesser chance of winning or a small award if they won. "167 
The Cook County study demonstrates how race had a significant im­
pact in torts in the latter half of the twentieth century. Inequality and 
bias may still persist in the tort system in submerged forms today, for 
example in devaluing harm to blacks relative to whites or in informal 
barriers to participation in the torts system.168 
162. For more contemporary consideration, see McClellan, supra note 23, and Chamallas, 
supra note 23. 
163. CHIN & PETERSON, supra note 161. 
164. /d. 
165. /d. The study notes that "[b]lack plaintiffs won somewhat less often than white: 40% as 
opposed to 46%, for example, in automobile accident trials." ld. 
166. /d. at ix. Regarding black defendants, the study notes that they "also lost somewhat 
more often than whites, with the difference again similar to that for plaintiffs. Liability decisions 
were about the same, then, when both parties were of the same race, but lawsuits between par­
ties of different races produced substantial differences: White plaintiffs, for example won 62% of 
slip and fall trials against black defendants, but black plaintiffs won only 50% of such suits 
against white defendants." ld. at viii. The report goes on to note that awards against black 
defendants were 10 percent less than awards against black defendants in similar trials. /d. at ix. 
Thus, jury decisions did not always work to the disadvantage of blacks, however, the report 
speculates that juries may have perceived that black defendants had fewer resources and so 
made lower verdicts, id. But "the lower awards against black defendants further reduced awards 
to black plaintiffs," since most suits against blacks were brought by other blacks. /d. at ix. 
167. /d. at ix. 
168. See supra note 23. 
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CONCLUSION 
Part of the story of "the color line" 169 in twentieth century law is 
the role that race and racism played in valuing injuries caused by torts 
in the United States. African Americans were systematically excluded 
from authoritative roles in the legal system, but participated as tort 
plaintiffs with considerable success in the first half of the century. In­
stitutional characteristics of the torts system, such as the use of contin­
gent fee agreements that broadened access to the tort system, and the 
practice of individualized adjudication, all contributed to this success. 
However, the principle that like cases should be treated alike was 
clearly violated in many instances, with claims brought by black plain­
tiffs devalued in the settlement and adjudication of torts cases during 
the first half of the twentieth century. The process of racial categori­
zation was a significant mechanism in devaluing blacks' claims. Pow­
erful actors in the torts system, ranging from railway company claim 
agents to trial and appellate judges, focused on the race of injured 
black people in the course of measuring their injuries, finding that 
their race necessarily made their injuries from torts worth less than 
injuries to whites. From a claims manual that asserted "a negro brake­
man is likely probably only a negro," to a trial judge who said that a 
black man's injury was necessarily less substantial than a white man's 
injury, to appellate judges who measured harm caused by the deaths 
of black family members based only on earlier cases involving deaths 
of blacks, these actors put harm to blacks in different categories than 
harm to whites. This categorization process was one mechanism that 
enabled decision-makers to ignore and evade the principle, important 
even during this era, that like cases should be treated alike. 
Moreover, the tradition in torts that every injury is individualized, 
with no exacting requirement that resuits in cases be compared, gave 
free reign to whites' bias and unfavorable treatment of blacks' claims, 
and also made such bias and unfavorable treatment very difficult to 
detect. Aggregate analysis of awards in dozens of fatality cases shows 
that awards to black families for the loss of a loved one were less than 
half of those to white families in similar situations. Losses suffered by 
blacks were treated as less valuable than losses to whites in otherwise 
comparable cases, and by the structure of wrongful death law. As 
awards to blacks were lower than awards to whites, torts cases both 
reflected and reinforced racial inequality. Such lower awards were 
169. D u Bots, supra note 1. 
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significant in themselves, but they also gave potential defendants 
lower incentives to prevent harm to blacks than to whites. Torts cases 
collectively gave a "public law" message that blacks were inferior to 
whitesP 0 Despite the achievements of the Civil Rights Movement 
against racial inequality, evidence suggests that devaluation of injury 
to blacks persisted past the first half of the twentieth century. Going 
forward , although race is no longer on the surface of tort law, we must 
be alert to the ways that different aspects of the torts system may con­
tribute to devaluing blacks' tort claims. 
170. Green, supra note 2. 
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